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Abstract
Criminalized copyright infringement has existed in Canada for close to a century. It has
continued to expand in scope and severity since its first appeared in the Copyright Act,
1921. As Canada approaches 2017’s scheduled review of the Copyright Act, the time has
come to ask whether the criminalization of copyright and its enforcement is theoretically
justifiable. Yet, Canadian scholarship on criminalized copyright infringement is
particularly scarce; there is a noteworthy gap in the existing literature wherein no one has
systematically argued against criminalized copyright infringement from a theoretical
perspective. This thesis aims to fill that gap, setting out a systematic legal and theoretical
argument that criminalized copyright infringement, whether for personal use or financial
gain, cannot be theoretically justified. In the absence of theoretical justification, the
Government should move to decriminalize copyright enforcement.

iii

List of Abbreviations Used
ACTA

Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

DMCA

Digital Millennium Copyright Act

DRM

Digital Rights Management

IP

Intellectual Property

ISP

Internet Service Provider

NET Act

No Electronic Theft Act

SCC

Supreme Court of Canada

TPM

Technological Protection Measure

TPP

Trans Pacific Partnership

TRIPS

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

WCT

WIPO Copyright Treaty

WPPT

WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty

WIPO

World Intellectual Property Organization

iv

Acknowledgements
This thesis is not about race; its words show no outside indication that race is, in any
way, a factor in its production. And yet, to me, that is the most important part. As an
African Nova Scotian woman, I am thankful for my education and the opportunity to
pursue an LL.M; an opportunity that, for various intersecting reasons, is often not
available to people like me.
This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and support of many
people. First and foremost, I am thankful to my family and friends for giving me the time
and space to be cranky, to vent, and to ramble on and on about “this really interesting part
of copyright law!” I want to thank Professor Penney for his insight and oversight of this
project, without which this thesis would either be a much weaker version of itself, or
incomplete. I want to thank Professor Currie and Professor Deturbide for their revisions
and guidance throughout the drafting process, Professor Devlin for his input during the
planning stages of this work, and Professor Ginn for setting me on the path to academia. I
also want to thank all of the librarians in the Sir James Dunn Law Library for answering
my never-ending research questions and allowing me to take up residence at my usual
spot. I am thankful to Professor Williams and Dr. Dozier for their mentorship, their
courage, and their inspiration as strong, educated black women.
Finally, I need to thank my dog, Max – my trusted late-night study-buddy and
proofreader extraordinaire, without whom I would have never survived round one of law
school, let alone round two.

v

Chapter 1 - Introduction
Canada has a unique tradition of copyright law.1 This uniqueness is evident from
Canada’s early struggles to break from the Imperial Copyright Act of 1842 and enact its
own copyright legislation.2 The Canadian copyright narrative is inextricably linked to the
British Empire; “England is whence the soil from which the Canadian narrative comes.” 3
Canada’s connectedness to the British Empire, its geographical proximity to the United
States, and the influence of international obligations shaped the early development of
Canadian Copyright Law, as they continue to shape its present-day development.4 The
molding of Canadian Copyright Law through outside influence can be seen through the
criminalization of copyright infringement and the continual increase of associated
conduct and penalties.5

1

See e.g. Meera Nair, “The Copyright Act of 1889: A Canadian Declaration of Independence” (2009) 90:1
The Canadian Historical Review 1 [“Canadian Declaration”].
2
Ibid at 2. See also 22-23. The British Empire resisted this move toward an independent Canadian
copyright regime for two predominant reasons: first, they were concerned about the impact it would have
on their attempts to negotiate an Anglo-American copyright agreement. Second, they believe that because
Canada was a signatory of the Berne Convention, there was no need to enact independent legislation.
3
Daniel Gervais, “A Canadian Copyright Narrative” (2008) 11:5-6 Journal of World Intellectual Property
432.
4
Nair, “Declaration of Independence,” supra note 1. For modern influence, see e.g. Miriam Bitton,
“Rethinking The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copyright Enforcement Measures”
(2012) 102:1 J Crim L & Criminology 67 [“Rethinking ACTA”]. Bitton discusses how ACTA “mimics the
U.S. approach” for criminalizing copyright law. Canada signed ACTA in 2011. Canada also signed and
ratified TRIPS, the first international agreement with enforcement measures against intellectual property
infringement. See also, David Vaver, “Opinion: Harmless Copying” (2012) 25:1 IPJ 19 at 21 [“Harmless
Copying”], referring to W Hayhurst, “Intellectual Property Laws of Canada: The British Tradition, the
American Influence and the French Factor” (1996) 10 IPJ 265 [“Canadian IP Laws”]: “Canada has usually
looked for inspiration for its intellectual property reforms to the United States for reasons of proximity and
competitiveness, and to Europe for reasons of tradition and culture.”
5
The criminal copyright provisions are codified in the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, ss 42(1.1), (2.1)
[Copyright Act]; they are not in the Criminal Code RSC 1985, c C-46. Typically this would mean that the
provisions are regulatory in nature, not true crimes. However, criminalized infringement is called a
“Criminal Remedy” in the Copyright Act, and it meets the Criminal Law requirements pursuant to
Constitutional principles and the division of powers: it is a public purpose, backed by a prohibition and
penalty. See e.g. Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of The Dairy Industry Act [1949] SCR 1, at 49 – 50,
1

As the Government moves into the next wave of copyright reforms scheduled to
begin in November 2017, it is important for Canada to continue to adopt its own
copyright narrative and break from American and European influences. 6 One way for
Canada to achieve this objective is to buck an historical trend and instead move to
decriminalize the copyright regime.
1. Historical Context & the Trend Towards Criminalized Infringement
Although criminal copyright provisions have existed in Canada for close to a
century, they have played a minimal if almost non-existent role in the copyright regime
until recently.7 The increase in importance of criminalized copyright infringement is
largely due to digitization, the internet, and the threats they pose to copyright protection
and enforcement.8 Together, digitization and the internet allow for (almost) simultaneous

1 DLR 433: “A crime is an act which the law, with appropriate penal sanctions, forbids.” See e.g. Canada,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2012 Intellectual Property (IP) Crime Statistics (Ottawa: Government of
Canada, 2013) online: <www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca> [RCMP Report], where the RCMP refers to “copyrighted
works” in their statistical report on Intellectual Property crimes. Sections 42(1.1) and (2.1) are also referred
to as criminal provisions by copyright scholars, see e.g. See e.g. Steven Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the
Digital Age” in Law Commission of Canada ed, What is a Crime? Defining Criminal Conduct in
Contemporary Society (Vancouver: UBC Press 2004) at 62, discussing the history of “criminal
punishments for copyright infringement.”
6
See Daniel Gervais, “Canadian Copyright Narrative,” supra note 3; David Vaver, “Opinion: Harmless
Copying,” supra note 4 at 21 – 22. Referring to the need to amend the Copyright Act to better
accommodate Users rights, “…there is more in heaven and earth than is dream of in these American- or
European-inspired philosophies.”
7
See e.g. Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the Digital Age,” supra note 5 at 62, note 3. The Copyright Act
SC 1921 c 24 [Copyright Act, 1921] contained criminal penalties enforced by way or summary conviction.
8
Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the Digital Age,” supra note 5 at 66, 67: “Digitization weakens the
material and legal barriers to copyright infringement.” Penney also notes that civil enforcement may not be
sufficient in the digital world because non-commercial infringers are unlikely to have insufficient assets to
satisfy a civil judgment. Other scholars make similar arguments. See e.g. Irina D Manta, “The Puzzle of
Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement”(20011) 42:2 Harv JL & Tech 469 [“Puzzle of
Criminal Sanctions”] at 503, noting copyright infringers often “do not have deep-pockets;” Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S Masur, “Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal
Intellectual Property Law” (2014) 87 S Cal L Rev 275 [“Innovation and Incarceration”] at 306 discussing
“judgment proof” defendants. Deterrence also plays a role in the shift from civil to criminal sanctions. This
argument is premised on the fact that civil remedies are insufficient to deter infringement. See e.g. Trotter
2

reproduction and dissemination of copyright protected content.9 This has induced
“copyright panic,” and a global push toward “Copyright Protectionism.”10
Copyright protectionism has many manifestations, all of which are significant
intrusions on user rights, which are rights held by the public to use copyright protected
content without needing to worry about copyright infringement.11 Bartholemew &
Tehranian have argued that copyright protectionism is partially responsible for the
“secondary liability revolution.”12 It is also responsible for the considerable and
continued expansion of author’s13 rights.14 Copyright now protects so much content that
only the “truly trivial or mechanical… goes unprotected.”15 In fact, all that is required to
attract copyright protection is an exercise of “skill and judgment.”16 The Copyright Act
has also expanded to protect against actions that may not amount to infringement by

Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement” (2002) 11:1 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 305 at 312; Manta, “Puzzle
of Criminal Sanctions,” supra note ______at 503.
9
See e.g. Penney, “Crime, Copyright and the Digital Age,” supra note 5 at 66.
10
Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, “The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of
Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law” (2006) 21 Berkely Tech LJ 1363, at 1403 [“Secret
Life”]. Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, 15 April 1994, BTS 10 (1996)
(entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS], the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 1 October 2011
(not yet in force) [ACTA], and other International Treaties (some of which are addressed in Chapter 6) are
evidence of international protectionism.
11
See e.g. David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd Ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2011), at 215–57.
12
Bartholemew & Tehranian, “Secret Life,” supra note 10 at 1364, 1366, 1403 – 1405. Secondary liability
is the “imposition of liability on a defendant who did not directly commit the violation at issue.” As applied
to copyright infringement, secondary liability typically refers to lawsuits against Internet Service Providers,
Network Operators and Software Providers for the copyright infringing actions of their users. MGM Studios
v Grokster, 545 US 913 (2005) and A&M v Napster, 239 F3d 1004 (2001) are examples of secondary
liability cases.
13
I have used “authors” throughout this Thesis to refer to the people who create copyright protected content
and are typical the beneficiaries of copyright protection. However this is an oversimplification. Large
Movie and Music companies are often the owners of copyright protected content, not the artists or authors.
Additionally, in work place settings, employers own copyrights, not authors. Any reference to author
should be taken to also include a reference to copyright owners.
14
See e.g. David Vaver, “Harmless Copying,” supra note 4. Vaver argues that copyright have continued to
expand since the Statute of Anne, Copyright Act, 1710 8 Ann c 21 [Statute of Anne].
15
Ibid at 20.
16
See e.g. CCH Canada v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at 16, 1 SCR 339.
3

prohibiting the circumvention of Technological Protection Measures (TPMs).17 The anticircumvention provisions leave no room to consider whether the TPM’s were
circumvented for the purpose of lawfully using the copyright protected content. In some
circumstances, it is possible that the content being protected by a TPM does not warrant
copyright protection; yet circumventing the TMP to access this content is nevertheless
prohibited.
Subjecting copyright infringement to criminal sanction is a significant component
of copyright protectionism. In Canada, criminalized copyright infringement has
continued to expand in scope and severity since its first appeared in the Copyright Act,
1921.18 The Act initially contained summary conviction offences punishable by a
maximum fine of $200 per transaction for a first offence, and up to two months
imprisonment “with or without hard labour” for a subsequent offences.19 Through a series
of amendments spanning close to a century, the Copyright Act now contains significantly
more severe penalties. Offenders are liable on summary conviction to a fine up to
$25,000, imprisonment for a term up to six months, or both.20 Offenders are liable on
indictment to a fine up to $1,000,000, imprisonment for a term up to five years, or both.21
2. Identifying a Gap: The Need for a Systemic Theoretical Argument Against
Criminalized Copyright Infringement
As Canada approaches 2017’s scheduled review of the Copyright Act, the time
has come to ask whether the criminalization of copyright and its enforcement is

17

See Copyright Act, 1985 supra note 5, s 41.1.
Copyright Act, 1921, supra note 7.
19
Ibid at s 24(1).
20
Copyright Act,1985, supra note 5 at s 41(2.1)(b).
21
Ibid at s 41(2.1)(a).
18

4

theoretically justifiable. Asking this question is important because these copyright
reforms typically result in further expansion of criminal liability,22 and the copyright
regime is currently failing to achieve its objective of incentivizing creation and ensuring
access to information by over-protecting authors rights.23 It is also important to ask this
question given the growing pressure to increase criminalization and police copyright
infringement from outside influences, and the far-reaching international implications of
criminalized infringement.24 In our increasingly interconnected world, it is possible to
infringe upon the works of creators in different jurisdictions. As a result of extradition
agreements and international treaties, there is a possibility that alleged infringers could be
subject to extradition to face charges of criminal copyright infringement, which further
exacerbates the costs of criminalization both to the alleged offender and the prosecuting
jurisdiction.25
22

See e.g. Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the Digital Age,” supra note 5 at 63, note 10; David W Scott
QC & Timothy Collins, “Criminal Copyright Offences: The Defence Perspective: Part I: Copyright
Offences Under the Copyright Act and the Criminal Code” 1995 38 Crim LQ 104 [“Part I”]. At 105 – 106
discuss the 1988 copyright revisions, the reports and documents considered during the revision, and note
that the criminal provisions of the copyright act were strengthened following that process.
23
See generally, Daniel Gervais, “Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright
Exceptions and Limitations” (2008) 5:1&2 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 1 [“Making
Copyright Whole”; David Vaver, “Creating a Fair Intellectual Property System for the 21 st Century” (2001)
10:1 Otago L Rev 1 [“Creating Fair IP”]; Vaver, “Harmless Copying,” supra note 4.
24
See e.g. Josh Rubin, “Canadians using illegal software less and less” The Star (12 May 2011), online:
<www.stestar.com>. The Unites States continues to put Canada on their Piracy “Priority Watch List,”
despite a decline in software piracy rates, and despite Canada having one of the lowest piracy rates in the
world. The U.S. is urging Canada to ratify the WIPO treaty and has “called for stricter border enforcement
and heavier penalties for copyright law violators, including jail time.”
25
See e.g. USA v Dotcom et al, 23 December 2015 District Court at North Shore, CRI -2012-092-001647
[unreported decision] [Dotcom]. This matter has been ongoing since 2012 and has yes to be heard on the
merits. In 2012 New Zealand police arrested Kim Dotcom on charges stemming form the United States
(charges include: conspiracy to commit racketeering; conspiracy to commit copyright infringement;
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments; multiple counts of criminal copyright infringement; multiple
counts of aiding and abetting criminal copyright infringement; fraud by wire; and, aiding and abetting fraud
by wire). Dotcom has challenged his extradition to the United States. In 2015, Dotcom was found eligible
for surrender to the United States on all 13 counts charges. Dotcom appealed this decision to the High
Court in 2016. On February 19, 2017, The High Court ruled that Dotcom could be extradited to the United
5

Yet, Canadian scholarship on criminalized copyright infringement is particularly
scarce, with Steven Penney and David Vaver the two predominant scholars on point. In
2004 Steven Penney explored and evaluated the criminalized infringement landscape in
Canada and the United States.26 Penney acknowledged that any criminalization of
copyright infringement should be “scrutinized” through both Criminal Law and
Copyright Law lenses.27 However despite concluding that there is no societal consensus
that copyright infringement is immoral – one of Criminal Legal Theory’s justification
requirements – he nevertheless chose not to argue against criminalized infringement.
Similarly, and perhaps even more surprisingly, renowned copyright scholar David
Vaver has not taken a definitive stand against criminalized infringement. Vaver’s work is
heavily grounded in Copyright Legal Theory. He has continually argued that Canadian
copyright regime is unbalanced due to the continual expansion of creator’s rights and
diminution of users rights.28 He has even gone so far as to call criminal copyright
sanctions “draconian,”29 and the severity of enforcement “particularly troublesome.”30

States. Dotcom plans to appeal the extradition order. See e.g. Elenor Ainge Roy, “Kim Dotcom extradition
to US can go ahead, New Zealand high court rules” The Guardian (20 February 2017), online:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/20/kim-dotcom-eligible-for-extradition-to-us-new-zealandhigh-court-rules>. In addition to the extradition hearings, there were various interim applications in both
New Zealand and the United States where Dotcom challenged the lawfulness of the police raid of his home,
and his arrest, the seizure of his assets, and sought stays of proceedings against him. See e.g. Chris
Tognotti, “Kim Dotcom’s 2012 asset seizure upheld by U.S. appeals court, appeal hearing set for Aug. 29”
Daily Dot (14 August 2016) online: <www.dailydot.com>; Rachel Weiner, “Kim Dotcom loses appeal to
keep millions” Washington Post (August 12, 2016) online: <www.washingtonpost.com>.
26
Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the Digital Age,” supra note 5.
27
Ibid at 68.
28
David Vaver, “Harmless Copying,” supra note 4 at 19 – 28. See also, Vaver, “Creating Fair IP,” supra
note 23 at 8 – 11.
29
Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 11 at 673.
30
David Vaver, “Harold G Fox Intellectual Property Lecture for 2012: Intellectual Property: Is It Still A
“Bargain”?” (2012) 24:2 IPJ 143 at 156 [“Is IP Still a Bargain”].
6

Yet he has not explicitly argued against criminalized infringement, nor undertaken a
deeper or more comprehensive theoretical or legal analysis.
Other Canadian authorities and scholars have also failed to undertake such an
analysis. Keys and Brunet31 and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright32 were
divided during the 1985 copyright review process. While Keys and Brunet argued for the
abolition of summary conviction offences,33 the Sub-Committee argued that the full force
of the criminal law should protect copyrights.34 Neither Keys and Brunet, nor the SubCommittee recognized the need to ground their work in legal theory, and therefore failed
to analyze criminalized infringement from a systematic theoretical perspective. Similarly,
Alan Young,35 and Scott & Collins36 discussed criminalized infringement from a practical
perspective. They both argued against criminalized infringement, though their work was
substantially doctrinal rather than theoretical.
In the United States there has been a broader discussion of criminalized copyright
infringement. Yet, the American scholars as a group have not argued against criminalized
copyright infringement from a systematic theoretical perspective, similarly to Canadians.
American scholars can be divided into two groups: (1) skeptics: who have argued for a
degree of restraint, either by not increasing penalties, or limiting criminal sanctions to
31

A A Keyes & C Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the Law (Supply and Services
Canada, 1985) [Copyright in Canada].
32
Canada, House of Commons, Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright, A Charter of Rights for
Creators (October 1985) (Chair: Gabriel Fontaine, MP) [Charter of Rights].
33
Keyes & C Brunet, Copyright in Canada, supra note 31 at 185.
34
Sub-Committee, Charter of Rights, supra note32 at 97.
35
Alan Young, “Catching Copyright Criminals: R v Miles of Music Ltd.” (1990) 5 IPJ 257 [Catching
Copyright Criminals].
36
Scott & Collins, Part 1, supra note 22; “Criminal Copyright Offences: The Defence Perspective: Part II:
Statutory Presumptions and Defences in Criminal Copyright Prosecutions” 1995 38 Crim LQ 158 [“Part
II”].
7

infringement on a commercial scale, and not personal use infringement;37 and (2)
expansionists: who have argued in favour of criminalized copyright infringement, and
increasing criminal liability.38
Irina D Manta,39 Geraldine Szott Moohr40 and the other skeptics have utilized
legal theory to an extent in their work. As a group Skeptics have been critical of
enforcing copyrights through the Criminal Law. They tend to argue that criminalization is
either unjustified, or the associated penalties should not be increased. In certain
circumstances, skeptics were prepared to accept that criminalized infringement might be
appropriate.
Conversely, Trotter Hardy,41 Michael M. DuBose,42 and the Task Force on
Intellectual Property43 fully embraced criminalized copyright infringement. They have
not only argued that it is appropriate and necessary to protect creators rights, but they
have also argued that increased criminalization is necessary to deter potential infringers.
37

See e.g. Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the Digital Age,” supra note 5; Manta, “Puzzle of Criminal
Sanctions,” supra note 8; Geraldine Szott Moohr, “The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory” (2009) 83 BUL Rev 731 [“Crime of Copyright
Infringement”], “Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal
Copyright Laws” (2005) 54 Am U L Rev 783 [“Defining Overcriminalization”]; Buccafusco & Masur,
“Innovation and Incarceration,” supra note 8; Eric Goldman, “A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic
Theft Act and Criminal Copyright Infringement” (2003) 82 Or L Rev 369 [“Road to No Warez”].
38
See e.g. Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement,” supra note 8; Miriam Bitton, “Rethinking ACTA,”
supra note 4 at 115, arguing that governments should consider adopting lower copyright protection
thresholds, among other, non-criminalization based approaches; Michael M DuBose, “Criminal
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws in the Twenty-First Century” (2006) 29 Colum JL & Arts 481
[Criminal Enforcement of IP”]; US, Department of Justice, Progress Report of the Department of Justice’s
Task Force on Intellectual Property (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2006) [Progress Report];
Report of the Department of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property (Washington DC: Department of
Justice, 2004) [Report].
39
Irina D Manta, “Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions,” supra note 8.
40
Geraldine Szott Moohr, “Defining Overcriminalization,” supra note 37, “Crime of Copyright
Infringement,” supra note 37.
41
Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement,” supra note 8.
42
Michael M DuBose, “Criminal Enforcement of IP,” supra note38.
43
Task Force, Report, supra note 38; Progress Report, supra note 38.
8

The exceptionists have usually invoked “theft” and “piracy” discourse when referring to
copyright infringement, arguably in an attempt to invoke society’s instinctual response
that the activity is wrong, and copyright “thieves” should be despised.44
In short, there is a noteworthy gap in the existing literature wherein no one has
systematically argued against criminalized copyright infringement from a theoretical
perspective. This thesis aims to fill that gap, setting out a systematic legal and theoretical
argument that criminalized copyright infringement, whether for personal use or financial
gain, cannot be theoretically justified. I conduct a systematic theoretical analysis of
criminalized copyright infringement. I argue against criminalization from the perspective
of Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic Theory and Property Theory; and argue in
favour of non-criminal enforcement from the perspective of Copyright Legal Theory and
Charter values. This theoretical analysis of criminalized enforcement is necessary to
understand why the regime should be decriminalized. It not only focuses the discussion
on what the current law is and what it ought to be, but it also anchors the discussion to the
Canadian justifications for treating conduct as criminal, in a manner that is reflective of
our fundamental values as a country. As will be seen in more detail in Chapter 2, this
perspective is missing from the current North American legal scholarship on this topic.
Overall, this work is located at the intersection of Criminal and Copyright Law.
Methodologically, I employ a systematic theoretical, doctrinal, and policy-based

44

See e.g. Patricia Loughlan “’You Wouldn’t Steal a Car’: Intellectual Property and the Language of
Theft” (2008) 29:10 Eur IP Rev 401 at 407 [“You Wouldn’t Steal”].
9

approach to analyze criminalized infringement through multiple lenses, and ultimately to
suggest potential reforms to the Copyright Act.
3. Thesis Structure and Outline
In Chapter 2 I summarize necessary background information for criminalized
copyright infringement in Canada and the United States. I provide a literature review of
Canadian and American scholarship on criminalized infringement and outline how
Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic Theory, Property Theory and Copyright
Theory have been levied to justify criminalized infringement.
In Chapter 3 I begin to disassemble the theoretical case for criminalized
infringement. I argue that criminalized infringement cannot be justified by Criminal
Legal Theory because it is neither morally wrong, nor causes sufficient harm to warrant
criminalization. With respect to harm, I also adopt a Law and Economic Theory
perspective to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of criminalized infringement’s deterrent
value. This highlights how criminalized infringement is more harmful than beneficial,
undermining the deterrence justification for criminalization. I conclude by arguing that
the Doctrine of Restraint advocates against criminalization because it is not an
“unavoidable necessity.”
In Chapter 4 I argue against the Property Theory of copyright. Property Theory
arguably justifies criminalization on the basis that copyrights are property and
infringement is therefore akin to theft. Although this is an effective rhetorical strategy, it
is not theoretically valid. Property Theory cannot justify criminalized copyright
enforcement. Copyrights are not property; they are legal rights that exist in opposition to
10

user rights. Even if we accept a property theory of copyrights, copyright infringement is
not theft. Copying intangible property is fundamentally different than taking tangible
property. Because intangible property is non-rivalrous, it does not require the same
degree of protection as tangible property. The Property Theory justification for
criminalization is also circular, assuming rather than proving that copyright is property.
In Chapter 5 I shift perspectives and begin to make a positive case for noncriminal copyright enforcement. Applying a Copyright Legal Theory lens, I argue that
non-criminal enforcement is consistent with the Copyright Act’s dual-objectives to
incentivize creation and ensure public access to information. The copyright regime is
justified by Balance Theory, which advocates that both authors and users rights must be
liberally interpreted to ensure both group’s rights are adequately protected. Non-criminal
enforcement mechanisms, such as the Notice-and-Notice regime, TPMs and Blockchain
Technology, are capable of effectively enforcing copyrights in a way that respects the
need to balance users’ and authors’ rights. I this Chapter I also argue that non-criminal
copyright enforcement is more consistent with Charter values than criminalized
enforcement. I focus particularly on section 1, and the minimal impairment requirement.
Finally, in Chapter 6 I re-iterate that Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic
Theory, and Property Theory cannot justify criminalized copyright infringement, and that
non-criminal copyright enforcement is consistent with both Copyright Legal Theory and
the Charter. I then discuss the important implications of this conclusion. Ideally the
Canadian Government should move to decriminalize copyright infringement during the
2017 Copyright Act review process. Every effort should be made to step-out of
11

international provisions that require criminalized enforcement. If this is not possible
given Canada’s international obligations, then the Government should at the very least
avoid further criminalizing copyright infringement. This will require the Government to
refrain from entering into international treaties and obligations that require criminal
copyright provisions, and refrain from expanding the existing provisions and applicable
penalties. While this approach may be inconsistent with the global trend towards further
criminalization it is consistent with Canadian values, and in keeping with our push to
develop a uniquely Canadian Copyright Act.

12

Chapter 2 – Legal Scholarship & the Theoretical
Justifications for Criminalized Copyright Enforcement
In this Chapter I lay the foundation for understanding the trend toward increased
criminalization in Canada and the U.S. I accomplish this objective in four parts. In Parts 1
and 2 I conduct a literature review of the prominent Canadian and American scholars
who have addressed the issue of copyright infringement. This review seeks to expose a
gap in the literature, wherein no other scholars have definitively argued against criminal
copyright infringement, for personal use or commercial gain, from a systematic
theoretical perspective.45 A theoretical perspective is necessary because it poses and
seeks to answer important questions about the law, including: what is the nature and
function of the law, and why and when is the law valid?46 The answers to these questions
guide the discussion of what criminal copyright infringement is, what it seeks to achieve,
and whether it reflects our societal values. Theory, then, provides a unified story to
understand the nature and functions of criminal copyright law. This architecture is
necessary to both critique and support criminalized infringement from an informed
perspective.
I begin the discussion of Canadian scholars in Part 1 with Stephen Penney, who
canvassed the issue of criminalized copyright infringement in 2004.47 Penney’s
description of the history of criminal copyright provisions in Canada and the U.S. is
helpful, as is his discussion of the moral ambiguity of copyright infringement. However
45
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Penney’s analysis is problematic and incomplete. Now only was he unwilling to
definitively argue against criminalized copyright infringement despite acknowledging
that it likely fails to meet the morality requirements of Criminal Legal Theory, he also did
not consider other theories that potentially support criminalization.
I move from Penney to notable copyright authority, David Vaver. Vaver is very
critical of the copyright regime in Canada, but he has not taken his criticisms to the
ultimate conclusion with respect to criminalized copyright infringement; he has gone to
the precipice, but has not taken the final step to argue against criminalization. Vaver has
been vocal about the need to reform the copyright regime and to lessen the scope and
length of copyright protection. From this I infer he is against criminal penalties, but he
has not been explicit about this, nor has he argued against criminalization from a
theoretical perspective.
In this Part I also discuss various sources pertaining to the 1985 Copyright Act
revision process. Although the Copyright Act was amended many times since its
inception in 1921, it was revised for the first time in 1985. Leading up to this revision,
parties spoke out in favour of both users’ and authors’ rights, often pitting them against
each other. A. A. Keys & C. Brunet argued to abolish criminal penalties for copyright
infringement,48 while the Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright argued to expand
them.49 Surprisingly, neither Keys & Brunet, nor the Sub-Committee provided any
theoretical support for their arguments despite suggesting significant reforms to the
copyright regime.
48
49
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Finally in this Part I discuss two sources that address criminal copyright
infringement in practice. Alan Young conducted a case study of Miles of Music, a 1990
criminal case involving a company that creates compilation CD’s for D.J.’s.50 Young’s
work reads more as a doctrinal analysis of abuse of process, rather than a theoretical
argument against criminalized copyright infringement. Similarly, defence attorneys
David W. Scott, Q.C. and Timothy Collins’ article also engages in a doctrinal analysis.51
They discussed what elements are necessary to ground a criminal conviction for
copyright infringement and subject the criminal provisions to a constitutional analysis.
Both Young, and Scoot & Collins, argued against criminalized infringement, but they
only minimally engaged with legal theories to support their conclusions.
In Part 2, I move into a discussion of American scholars, who I divide into two
groups: skeptics and expansionists. Irina D. Manta52 and Geraldine Szott Moohr53 lead
the American skeptics. They are comfortable with criminalized infringement in limited
circumstances, specifically for commercial gain, and do not believe that it should be
further expanded. While they have relied on some legal theory to support their
arguments, they have not engaged in a systematic theoretical analysis that addresses the
main theories used to justify criminalization, nor have they argued against all forms of
criminalization, whether for personal use or commercial gain. In this section I also
discuss Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur,54 and Eric Goldman.55 These scholars
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have invoked legal theory to a lesser extent than Manta and Moohr. Buccafusco &
Masur’s work is (almost) exclusively set in Law and Economic Theory, while Goldman’s
work is more doctrinal than theoretical. Similarly to Manta and Moohr, they do not
systematically argue against all forms of criminalization from a theoretical perspective.
Michael DuBose56 and Trotter Hardy57 lead the expansionists. They have not only
argued that criminalized copyright infringement is justified, but they have also argued
that the scope and penalties of criminal liability need to be increased. 58 Both Hardy and
DuBose’s works are theoretically incomplete. Hardy relied heavily on Law and
Economic Theory, but did not support his assumption that increased criminalization
necessarily leads to increased deterrence.59 He also attempted to explain away
conclusions that do not support his claim that Criminal Legal Theory justifies
criminalization.60 DuBose’s work is incomplete insofar as it is noticeable lacking any
theoretical analysis, and heavily dependent on fear-inducing rhetoric.61
In this section I also discuss the Department of Justice’s Task Force on
Intellectual Property,62 and Grimm, Guzzi & Rupp.63 While the Task Force blatantly
argued for increased criminalization, Grimm et al only acknowledged the existence of
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criminalization as a response to increased intellectual property “theft.”64 This is arguably
acceptable from Grimm et al given the objective of their work was a summary of
Intellectual Property Law. However, this oversight, or blatant disregard, for legal theory
to justify increased criminalization by the Task Force undermines the integrity of their
work. As a group, the American Expansionists have not only argued in favour of
criminalization and increased penalties, but they have not expressly or thoroughly
invoked legal theory to justify their arguments.
In Part 3 I briefly define and discuss the four predominant legal theories that have
been levied to justify criminal copyright infringement. First, Criminal Legal Theory
arguably justifies criminalization on the basis that copyright infringement is immoral and
causes harm to copyright owners through lost revenue, and harm to society through lost
incentive to create. Second, Law and Economic theory arguably justifies criminalization
on the basis that criminal penalties are better suited than civil liability to deter potential
infringers. Third, Property Theory arguably justifies criminalization by analogy. Because
tangible and intangible properties are analogous, and there is social consensus that taking
tangible property is a crime, copyright infringement should also be criminalized. Finally,
Copyright Theory arguable justifies criminalization on the basis that copyrights need
stronger protection due to digital technologies enabling large-scale copyright
infringement.
In Part 4 I provide a summary of this Chapter and a road map for the remainder of
this thesis. In subsequent chapters I systematically set out each theory, explain how it has
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been interpreted to support criminalization, and ultimately know each justification down.
I also argue that Copyright Legal Theory and Charter values actually support noncriminalized enforcement. This process will show that criminalized copyright
infringement is theoretically unsound. In the absence of sustainable theoretical
justification, the Canadian Government has no grounds to criminalize copyright
infringement and should therefore take necessary steps to decriminalize the copyright
regime. Decriminalization is a step away from copyright conformity with the United
States and Britain, upon whom much of Canadian copyright legislation and policy is
based. But Canada has been attempting to enact its own copyright legislation for more
than a century.65

The Government should see decriminalization as reforming the

Copyright Act to more accurately reflect Canadian culture and values. I conclude by
explaining the steps the Government should take to decriminalize copyright infringement
in Canada.
1. Canadian Legal Scholarship
Very few Canadian scholars and practitioners have discussed the use of criminal
law to enforce copyright infringement. Those who have written about criminal copyright
infringement have stated that it is unnecessary, inappropriate, or draconian; that it should
be used with restraint; or that the associated penalties should be increased. These
critiques have minimal theoretical foundations. While Criminal Legal Theory, Property
Theory, Law and Economic Theory and Copyright Theory are all relevant to the
discussion of criminalized copyright infringement, as I will explain in this part, the
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Canadian Scholars do not (to varying degrees) consider and apply these theories in their
respective arguments.
In 2014, Professor Steven Penney set out to “describe and evaluate efforts to
criminalize copyright law in the digital era.”66 To accomplish this objective, Penney
began by tracing the history of criminal copyright infringement in Canada and the United
States, and explaining how digitization “weakens the material and legal barriers to
copyright infringement.”67 From there, Penney shifted into an analysis of whether
copyright infringement warrants criminal punishment. He first defined crime as “a
publicly-enforced legal wrong punishable by sanctions that include the possibility of
imprisonment,”68 before subjecting it to a normative theoretical analysis.
Penney assessed criminal copyright infringement from both a moral and economic
perspective.69 From a moral perspective, Penney considered whether copyright
infringement is inherently wrong. He queried whether copyright infringement was
culpable by analogy to “uncontroversially criminal” behaviour like theft of ordinary
property,70 whether there is societal consensus that copyright infringement is culpable,71
and whether it is culpable because it causes harm.72 He concluded that the moral
approach did not demonstrate that “criminalizing infringement is itself morally
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unjustifiable.”73 From an economic perspective, Penney evoked a traditional approach to
Economic Theory to question whether criminalization is necessary for optimal
deterrence. He considered the negative effects of the Government imposing punishments
that are “out of proportion with social norms,” including increased criminality and
reduced deterrent value;74 and the need for “stiff penalties” to compensate for low
detection rates.75 He concluded that criminalizing commercial infringement accords with
economic criminalization theory, while criminalizing non-commercial infringement is
problematic.76
Ultimately, Penney did not take a definitive stand on whether copyright
infringement should be criminalized. Although his introduction suggested that he
“concludes by recommending restraint regarding the expansion of criminal copyright
law,” in effect, his conclusion did not live up to this expectation. He conceded that “the
push to criminalize copyright is understandable” in light of how digitization has
expanded the scope of copyright infringement.77

However he also acknowledged

skepticism with respect to the criminal law’s ability to “solve complex social
problems.”78
Penney incorporated the most theoretical discussion in his work, compared to the
other scholars that I will discuss in this section. He briefly touched on Copyright Theory,
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noting the balance it strives to create between authors and creators,79 and briefly engaged
in a discussion of the differences between intellection and tangible property.80 Penney
provided an in depth discussion of both Criminal Legal Theory and Law and Economic
Theory. However, there are two main issues with Penney’s work. First, despite
acknowledging that there is considerable debate as to whether intellectual property and
tangible (ordinary) property are analogous, Penney avoided answering the question.81
More problematic, however, is Penney’s decision not to argue for decriminalized
infringement despite asserting many times that moral and economic theories do not
justify criminalization.82 Operating from the perspective that criminal conduct requires
justification, which Penney himself accepted,83 his willingness to accept criminalized
infringement as legally valid was theoretically unsound.
David Vaver is a recognized Canadian copyright scholar. He is frequently cited
by the Supreme Court of Canada and is the author of Intellectual Property Law,84 a
predominant source on the Intellectual Property regime in Canada. Throughout his
various works, Vaver has criticized many aspects of the copyright regime. In Intellectual
Property Law, he questioned whether copyright can and should exist in the digital
world.85 Compared to other scholars who have critiqued digital technologies for allowing
large-scale copyright infringement and disrupting the balance between authors and users
79
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rights, Vaver instead sees digital technologies as a highlighter. He argued that digital
technologies “highlight the illogicalities and inequalities in the current workings of the
intellectual property system, and the consequent need for radical reform.”86
Vaver has accused both civil and criminal copyright sanctions as being
draconian.87 He has argued that since copyright’s inception in the Statute of Anne,
“legislatures worldwide have succumbed to a seemingly irresistible impulse to protect
more and more for longer and longer, and ask less and less from beneficiaries in
return.”88 He has criticized legislatures for curtailing users rights, while simultaneously
expanding authors rights without the ethical or empirical support usually required to
justify restricting individual liberty and competition.89 He noted this critique is especially
true because copyright law is uncertain and ill attuned to societal habits.90 Vaver has also
called the severity of intellectual property enforcement “particularly troublesome.”91
Despite these critiques, Vaver has not explicitly argued against criminalized
infringement. He has argued for copyright reform as a means to re-set the balance
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between authors' and users’ rights.92 From this I may be correct to infer that he thinks
criminalization is too extreme and unnecessary to protect authors’ rights, however Vaver
has not expressly addressed criminalized copyright infringement, nor has he definitely
argued against it from a theoretical perspective.
In 1977, during a period when Canadian Copyright Law was under revision, A. A.
Keys and C. Brunet argued for the abolition of summary conviction offences in the
Copyright Act.93 From their perspective, summary offences were inconsistent with the
principle that copyright, as a private right, “should not be enforced by the government but
rather by those who have a legal interest in obtaining redress for their infringed rights.”94
While they noted the temptation of enforcing copyright infringement by way of criminal
sanction, and acknowledge arguments that “effective criminal remedies exist not only to
punish… but also to act as a deterrent,” Keys & Brunet were of the view that copyright
infringement was “not so antisocial as to be considered offensive to the fundamental
values of society.”95 While this reference to fundamental values alluded to moral
justifications of crime, Keys & Brunet did not expressly invoke Criminal Legal Theory in
their argument.
Surprisingly, in suggesting revisions for the Copyright Act, Keys and Brunet only
dedicated four paragraphs of their 245-page book to a discussion of Copyright Theory.96
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They noted the Canadian Copyright Act developed from English Law, which views
copyrights as a “species of property rights;” contrasted this to the European approach to
copyright, which emphasizes the protection of pecuniary and moral rights; and ultimately
concluded their theoretical discussion noting, “concern with the underlying social
philosophy of copyright law is unwarranted unless different theories lead to different
conclusions.”97 This conclusion is baffling, not only because the authors did not
recognize that different theoretical understandings of copyright law necessarily lead to
different conclusions with respect to authors’ and users’ rights; but also because they did
not provide concrete theoretical support for their suggested revisions throughout their
work.
The Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright released A Charter of Rights
for Creators in 1985.98 The Sub-Committee made a total of 137 recommendations
relating to all aspects of copyright law. With respect to criminal offences, the SubCommittee recommended they be retained and that their monetary penalties be increased
to $1million.99 In making this recommendation the committee noted copyright “theft,”
costs copyright owners “millions of dollars every year.”100 As such, “copyright owners
need the full force of the criminal law to protect their intellectual property.” 101 These
increased penalties were meant to signal to the Courts the seriousness of copyright
infringement.102
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Although the Sub-Committee analogized copyright infringement to theft, they did
not provide any support, theoretical or otherwise for their necessary assumption that
copyright infringement is equivalent to theft. As I will discuss in more detail in
subsequent chapters, this assumption is theoretically unsound. Furthermore, the SubCommittee did not discuss Criminal Legal Theory, despite recommending “the full force
of the criminal law” be exerted to protect intellectual property.103 Even more surprisingly,
however, is their blatant disregard for Copyright Theory, despite their purpose being to
“modernize and improve” the Copyright Act.104 Similarly to Keys & Brunet, the SubCommittee made a significant amount of recommendations to amend the Copyright Act,
but provided zero theoretical support for their recommendations.
Similarly to Keys & Brunet, Alan Young also questioned the use of criminal law
to vindicate private rights.105 Young viewed the criminal process as a trap, and used R v
Miles of Music106 as a case study to articulate the dangers of resorting to criminal
prosecutions to remedy copyright violations.107 Although Young made reference to
Keyes & Brunet’s argument against criminal copyright infringement, he argued that
103
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Miles of Music “should renew interest in the issue of whether criminal sanctions are an
appropriate and proportionate response to copyright infringement.”108
Young did make some reference to both Criminal and Copyright Theory in his
work. He questioned whether copyright infringement was sufficiently immoral to warrant
criminal sanction,109 and noted the dual purpose of the Copyright regime to protect the
interests of creators and the public.110 However, Young did not actively engage with
either theory; rather, he stated a few principles of each to frame his doctrinal analysis of
Miles of Music.111 While this was effective for his discussion of the courts missapplication of the abuse of process doctrine, it provided little guidance whether
criminalized infringement was theoretically justified.
Lawyers David W. Scott, Q.C. & Timothy Collins, reviewed criminal copyright
infringement from a criminal defence perspective in a two-part series of articles
published in 1996.112 Ultimately, they concluded that copyright infringement should not
be criminalized. Similarly to Young, the bulk of Scott & Collins’ first article was
primarily focused on the criminal copyright provisions in practice.113 They engaged in a
doctrinal analysis discussing the essential elements the Crown must prove to secure a
criminal copyright conviction.
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Scott & Collins did engage in some theoretical analysis in their work. They
discussed Criminal Legal Theory with significant reference to the Law Reform
Commission of Canada’s and the Department of Justice’s comments on the purpose and
scope of the criminal law during the 1970’s Criminal Code review process.114 In applying
the Law Reform Commission’s criminality test,115 they made some reference to
Copyright Legal Theory and the purposes of the copyright regime, though the scope of
this discussion was minimal.116 The authors also mentioned the concept of deterrence,
though they did not ground it in Law and Economic Theory.117 Finally, Scott and Collins
did not address, let alone mention, Property Theory.
Given the goal of their article was to discuss criminalized copyright infringement
from the criminal defence perspective, the lack of theoretical analysis in Scott & Collins
work is not surprising. However, because they did not engage in a thorough theoretical
analysis, Scott & Collin’s article does little to help us understand whether criminalized
copyright infringement is theoretically justified.
The scholars discussed in this part not only vary in their opinions on whether
copyright infringement should be criminalized, but they also vary with respect to the
amount of theoretical analysis used to support those opinions. As a group, they have
114
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discussed Criminal Theory, Property Theory, Law and Economic Theory and Copyright
Theory. However, none of these scholars have provided a succinct, systematic argument
against criminalized copyright infringement from a theoretical perspective. The scholars
in the following Part deserve the same critique.
2. U.S. Legal Scholarship
Compared to Canada, the U.S. has a denser discussion of criminal copyright
infringement. Generally, American scholars writing on this topic may be divided into two
groups: skeptics and expansionists. Skeptics are critical of the use of criminal sanctions to
enforce copyright infringement. They have typically argued that criminal sanctions are
unjustified; they should be used with restraint; they should only apply to commercial
infringement; or that the penalties associated with criminalized copyright infringement
should not be increased. Conversely, expansionists support criminal copyright
infringement and have typically argued that the provisions should be expanded and the
applicable penalties should be increased.
In this Part I reviews some of the prominent sources of both American skeptic and
expansionist arguments. In doing so I highlight an apparent gap in the literature wherein
no American scholars, skeptics or expansionists alike, have explicitly argued either for or
against criminalized copyright infringement from a theoretical perspective. Similarly to
Canadian Scholars, both groups of American Scholars engage in some theoretical
analysis in the respective works. Skeptics have usually to invoked Copyright Theory and
Property Theory in their arguments, while expansions have usually focused heavily on
Law and Economic Theory and the concept of deterrence. Both groups have failed to
28

engage in a thorough theoretical analysis of criminalized infringement. In subsequent
chapters, I will fill in this gap in the literature. Not only will I compile and explain the
various theories that have been used to justify criminalized copyright infringement in one
cohesive document, but I will also systematically argue against all forms of criminalized
copyright infringement from a theoretical perspective.
A. American Skeptics
Irina Manta suggested that the U.S. should consider eliminating criminal
sanctions for non-commercial copyright infringement.118 Manta broadly canvassed the
criminalization of “soft IP” (trademarks and copyrights), and patents. She argued that
although there are criminal sanctions for infringing soft IP, the inherent difference
between soft IP and patents, and public choice rationales, have resulted in patent
infringement not being criminalized.119 To even the playing field, Manta’s solution was
to decriminalize non-commercial infringement, rather than criminalize patent
infringement.120 In making this suggestion, Manta noted that the potential harms of
criminalization, including chilling effects and the cost of prosecution, might outweigh its
potential benefits.121
Manta’s analysis was heavily grounded in theory. Throughout her article she
repeatedly referenced and discusses Criminal Theory, Intellectual Property Theory,
118
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Copyright Theory, and Property Theory. In fact, the first Part of her article discussed why
taking of physical property is considered theft, and the trend towards treating intellectual
property infringement as theft.122 Manta also made reference to Law and Economic
Theory’s conceptions of deterrence and using a cost-benefit analysis to determine legal
efficiency.123

However, because Manta’s objective was to explain why patent

infringement was not criminalized, she did not take a definitive stand against
criminalized infringement. Her article cannot stand alone as a complete argument for
decriminalizing copyright infringement.
Geraldine Szott Moohr interpreted this cost-benefit analysis through the lens of
over criminalization.124 Similarly to Manta, she was skeptical about imposing criminal
sanctions on personal use infringement, as criminalization could “undermine the reasons
for enacting the law in the first place,” which is to encourage creation. 125 Moohr
suggested that civil laws are more appropriate to remedy copyright infringement as they
are better suited to balance authors’ and users’ interests, and “do not run the risk of over
deterrence.”126 This balance is important, as copyright law has a dual purpose: to
encourage innovation, and to ensure access to information.127 The use of criminal law to
narrow public uses of information “seem almost perverse … at a time when the potential
for access has never been more promising.”128
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Together, Moohr’s articles actively engaged Law and Economic Theory and
Criminal Theory. In “Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Example of Criminal Copyright Laws,” she conducted a cost-benefit analysis, which is an
invocation of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,129 and she also explained both the Internal and
External Control Theories of deterrence.130 In “The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An
Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory,” Moohr assessed the harm and
morality of copyright infringement.131 She also discussed Copyright Theory, and the dual
purpose of the copyright regime.132 However, Moohr did not actively discuss Property
Theory, nor did she definitively argue against criminalized copyright infringement.133
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur also argued for a limited role for
criminalization, from an economic perspective.134 They noted that criminal sanctions,
including imprisonment, might have some deterrent value; however, they argued that to
be efficient, criminal sanctions must be limited in scope. 135 According to Buccafusco &
Masur, criminal penalties may be more efficient when self-help is costly, and civil
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remedies do not efficiently deter behaviour.136 They suggested imposing three limits on
the use of criminal sanctions. First, criminal sanctions should only apply to “exact
duplication of copyrighted works that will directly substitute for legitimately available
copies.”137 Second, criminal liability should be subject to a strict mens rea
requirement.138 Finally, they suggested that the circumvention of technological protection
measure should only be criminalized where it is not done for purposes of fair use, or to
access content that is not copyright protected.139
The Buccafusco & Masur article is, unsurprisingly, heavily based in Law and
Economic Theory. From this perspective they did provide some analysis of Copyright
Theory, noting the use of copyright law to incentivize creation. 140 Unfortunately, in their
discussion of property related crime, they did not to differentiate between tangible and
intangible property, and instead incorporated a “theft” analogy into their assessment.141
Similarly to some of the other scholars discussed in this part, they did not provide a
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detailed discussion of Criminal Theory, despite arguing that criminal sanctions may be
appropriate “with respect to a discrete set of activities.”142
Eric Goldman was critical of the language used to discuss copyright
infringement.143 In particular, he criticized the NET Act,144 and its incorporation of the
“shoplifter analogy” into criminal copyright infringement. 145 Goldman argued that
treating copyright infringement like theft creates a scope problem, whereby the harm of
copyright infringement is overstated, as not all infringing copies directly correlate to a
“criminally cognizable loss.”146 For Goldman, this result extended the boundaries of
criminal copyright law too far.147
While Goldman’s critique of the shoplifter analogy is helpful in arguing against
criminalized copyright infringement, his article is predominantly a historical and
doctrinal account of the NET Act, rather than a theoretical critique. He did discuss some
concepts common to Law and Economic Theory. In particular, he conducted a costbenefit analysis of the NET Act,148 and argued that it may not effectively deter warez149
traders because it misconstrues their motivation, assuming they act in rationally
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calculated ways.150 Goldman also alluded to Criminal Theory, suggesting that society did
not believe copyright infringement is immoral,151 though he did not engage in an in depth
discussion of the justifications of crime.
The scholars discussed in this section have argued for a limited role for criminal
copyright infringement. They have argued that criminal sanctions should be used with
restraint, that they are likely only justified for commercial infringement and that they
should not be further expanded. Although the Skeptics have used legal theories to varying
degrees in their respective works, none have argued that copyright infringement should
be decriminalized from a systematic theoretical perspective addressing the four
predominant theories that have been used to justify criminalization. Although Manta and
Moohr did canvass various theories in their respective works, neither definitively argued
against criminalized infringement. Buccafusco & Masur provided a detailed analysis of
criminalized infringement from a Law and Economic perspective, however because they
did not discuss Criminal Legal Theory and differentiate between tangible and intangible
property, and actively use “theft” discourse, their article does not address the need for this
thesis. Goldman provided insight into the problematic use of theft discourse through his
critique of the shoplifter analogy, though his work was largely historical and doctrinal,
and therefore does not alleviate the need for a systematic theoretical argument against
criminalized copyright infringement.
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B. American Expansionists
Michael DuBose, former Chief of the Intellectual Property Division of the
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Sections of the Department of Justice, argued
for a stronger role for criminal law in enforcing intellectual property rights. 152 He
repeatedly referred to infringers as thieves and criminals; drew reference to the use of
“counterfeit-goods trafficking” to fund organized crime; compared the sale of illegally
copied DVDs to drug trafficking; and stipulated, “there are signs that terrorist
organizations are following suit.”153 This rhetoric was fear inducing, and used to further
his position that strong action is required by criminal enforcement.154
DuBose made three recommendations to strengthen criminal enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Again, his focus was predominantly procedural. First, he
recommended updating criminal intellectual property laws to respond to “the exploitation
of new technologies,” and global challenge of intellectual property crime. 155 Second, he
recommended devoting adequate resources to fund investigations and prosecutions of
intellectual property crimes; and finally, he recommended that the United States continue,
“to lead in global enforcement efforts.”156
In making these recommendations, DuBose made several troubling assumptions.
First, he assumed that having dedicated IP enforcement agents would increase
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prosecutions, and therefore lead to increased deterrence.157 While this is arguably a
reference to Law and Economic Theory, DuBose made no attempt to justify this claim.
Second, DuBose referenced what he calls “a disturbing trend,” whereby previously lawabiding citizens were being “easily enticed into criminal behavior on the internet.158 Not
only did DuBose fail to support this claim with empirical evidence about who, and how
many, otherwise law-abiding citizens were “enticed” into intellectual property crime; but
he also failed to define criminal behaviour, and made no reference to Criminal Legal
Theory. In doing so, DuBose assumed that infringement is a criminal act. This
assumption led DuBose to his most troubling statement. He began by acknowledging that
many of the people involved in online intellectual property infringement “are
professionals, parents, home PC users – not the usual suspects for those likely to commit
five- and ten-year felonies.”159 Then, he concluded this “disturbing phenomenon…
challenges law enforcement to maximize the deterrent value of individual
convictions.”160
Arguably, DuBose acknowledged that this “disturbing phenomenon” was
evidence of a lack of societal consensus around the immorality of online infringement.
He immediately called for greater publicity of convictions and “encouraging convicted
defendants to speak at local schools,” arguably in an effort to convince the public of the
wrongfulness of this conduct.161 Unfortunately, because DuBose did not engage in any
Criminal Theory in this article, and did not define what constitutes a crime, he failed to
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reconcile his conclusion with the fact that immorality is a fundamental requirement of
criminality. If the public needed to be convinced that online infringement was wrong,
through publicity and school lectures, then arguable there was no societal consensus, and
therefore the criminality requirements were not met.162 Had DuBose properly engaged in
a theoretical analysis, rather than resort to fear-inducing and hyperbolic language, then
perhaps he would have arrived at an alternate conclusion as to whether online
infringement is criminal.
Trotter Hardy, in somewhat confusing fashion, picked up on the need for greater
deterrence of copyright infringement.163 Hardy began by questioning whether copyright
infringement was properly characterized as white-collar crime, without giving a detailed
explanation of why this classification was important. Nevertheless, and without expressly
stating his shift into Law and Economic theory, Hardy’s concern quickly shifted to the
deterrent value of increased criminalization.164 He argued that sever criminal sanctions
would lead to greater deterrence where crime was hard to detect and enforce.165 In such
circumstance, “sharply increased penalties become one of the legal system’s few effective
responses.”166

162

The argument could be made that the fact that there is legislation criminalizing copyright infringement
equals societal consensus. This is because society elects government officials and delegates to them the
authority to make laws, and the legislature has chosen to criminalize copyright infringement. However, I
would suggest that the legislature is out of touch with societal consensus as it relates to copyright
infringement. I articulate this point more fully in Chapter 3(2)(A), below. Briefly, there is data to suggest
that society does not believe that copyright infringement is wrong. If this data is accurate, then the fact that
the legislature has criminalized copyright infringement cannot equate to societal consensus.
163
See Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement,” supra note 8 at 313.
164
Ibid at 312.
165
Ibid at 313.
166
Ibid at 341, emphasis added.
37

According to Hardy, copyright infringement fit this description. He noted the
likelihood of being caught for copyright infringement online is “almost zero,” and that
copyright infringement has increased as a result.167 In rejecting arguments that copyright
law should be abandoned in light of the high incidence with which it occurs, and the low
chance of enforceability, Hardy argued, “the deterrence of such activity can nevertheless
be brought up to almost any desired level by increasing the punishment for those who do
get caught.”168As such, he concluded that increased criminalization “makes sense.”169
Hardy made several assumptions here. First, he assumed that increased penalties
actually increase deterrence. In doing so, he assumed that people act in rationally
calculated ways, factoring in the “costs, benefits, and probabilities” of getting caught for
their wrongdoing.170 Hardy did not give any indication of how high copyright
infringement penalties will need to be in order to achieve optimal deterrence, however he
nevertheless concluded that it is possible. In doing so, Hardy assumed the penalty would
be proportionate to the crime. From a Canadian perspective, this necessarily raises
constitutional issues, as disproportionate penalties may violate the Charter.
Hardy briefly discussed Criminal Legal Theory, acknowledging that criminal
conduct must be “egregious enough to affect or offend the entire community.”171 It would
seem that Hardy’s argument for increased criminalization to deter copyright infringement
failed here because the “public [was] not on board” with treating infringement as
criminal. However, rather than acknowledging this defeat, Hardy instead proposed an
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alternate theory to explain this disconnect between public opinion and increased
criminalization.172
First, Hardy believed the public was “ambivalent” to view copyright as property.
This was troublesome for him, as “intangible creations and tangible ones – exhibit no
inherent, and no logical, differences for the purposes of the legal regime of property
ownership;” they are “legally equivalent.”173 Second, Hardy explained this ambivalence.
He argued that our “instincts” about property allow us to view the “unauthorized taking”
of physical property as theft, but we do not view the unauthorized taking of intangible
property as theft.174

Because society was more familiar with tangible property, we

learned form a young age to associate “property” with tangible objects, and therefore
understood stealing as taking a physical object, not an intangible one. 175 Next, because
we viewed property in this way, the notion that property is a bundle of rights with respect
to an object, and not the object itself, was not intuitive.176 Finally, Hardy asserted that
because we have failed to intuitively understand property as a bundle of rights, we fail to
view intangible property as property. This failure led to our inability to see copyright

172

Hardy concludes with two hypotheses: the first is about our inexperience with intellectual property that I
discuss in more detail. The second, which I do not discuss in the body of my thesis, has to do with decisionmaking experience. Hardy argues that because “few of us routinely experience making decisions that affect
large number of people… we are thus predisposed to give greater weights and significance to small-scale
experience… and less likely to appreciate large-scale effects that result only from aggregation of our own,
and many strangers’, actions over periods of time.” Copyright infringement results in aggregate harm in
this way: downloading a single song has minimal effects, however millions of people downloading a single
song creates an aggregate harm.
173
Ibid at 334.
174
Ibid at 332.
175
Ibid at 332 – 33.
176
Ibid at 333.
39

infringement as a violation of property rights, and therefore our failure to equate
infringement with theft, or view it as harmful.177
Although Hardy’s theory made for an interesting read, it does not stand up to
scrutiny. First, Hardy provided minimal, and at times zero, sources to support his
conclusions. He acknowledged that he was neither a sociologist nor a psychologist, but
did not provide any scientific of sociological evidence to support his hypotheses about
our understanding and experience of property.178 Second, Hardy made no reference to
Property Theory to justify his hypothesis, despite his attempt to define property. Rather
than a theoretically sound justification of criminalized copyright infringement, Hardy’s
article seems to instead highlight many of the issues involved in treating copyright
infringement as criminal.
In 2004, the Department of Justice commissioned a Task Force with a mandate to
“examine the all of the Department of Justice’s intellectual property enforcement efforts
and to explore ways for the Department of Justice to increase its protection of valuable
intellectual property resources.”179 The Task Force produced a Report recommending
changes to intellectual property law and enforcement, emphasizing the Department of
Justice’s commitment to aggressively enforce “theft” of copyrighted works.180 Included
in these recommendations were increased resources, investigations, and prosecutions of
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intellectual property crimes;181 enforcing laws that criminalize circumventing
technological protection measures;182 prosecuting the “passive sharing of copyright
works;”183

and

creating

criminal

liability

for

secondary

copyright

infringement.184According to the Progress Report released in June 2006, the Department
of Justice has implemented all the recommendations of the 2004 Report.185
Similarly to the Canadian Sub-Committee, the Task Force did not engage in an
analysis of Copyright Theory, or Criminal Theory, despite arguing for increased
criminalization of copyright infringement. Further, the Report did not discuss Property
theory, despite classifying copyright infringement as theft,186 a crime typically associated
with physical property; nor did the Report address Law and Economic theory despite
referencing the concept of deterrence.187
Finally, Grimm, Guzzi, & Rupp picked up on Hardy’s argument that
criminalization increases deterrence. They noted that the increase in intellectually
property “theft,” and the ineffective deterrence provided by civil remedies, led the
government towards using the criminal law to protect intellectual property.188 However,
their work was more of a summary of the existing intellectual property crime landscape,
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rather than a comment on the appropriateness of criminal sanctions from a theoretical
perspective.189
Notwithstanding

the

perspective

of

American

skeptics,

and

their

recommendations for a limited role for criminal law in regulating copyrights, the
criminalization of copyright infringement is progressively evolving in the U.S. This
expansion of criminal liability is particularly relevant to Canada. The arguments used to
justify criminalization in the U.S. can easily be championed and incorporated into our
legislation. This is especially true given our history of connectedness and subordination
to the U.S. and British perspectives on Copyright Law.190 Therefore, in arguing for
decriminalization, I will address both Canadian and American perspectives on
criminalized copyright infringement, and the theories that have been levied to justify its
existence.
In the following Part I will briefly explain how Criminal Legal Theory, Law and
Economic Theory, Property Legal Theory, and Copyright Theory have been used to
justify criminalizing copyright infringement, and connect these theories to the existing
literature. In subsequent chapters I will set out an in depth explanation of each theory and
further details on how it arguably justifies criminalization before systematically attacking
each of these justifications. In doing so, I argue that criminalized copyright infringement
cannot be justified by Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic Theory, Property Legal
Theory, and that Copyright Theory and Charter values support non-criminalized
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enforcement. Because crimes must be theoretically justified, and criminalized copyright
infringement is not, I conclude by offering steps the Government should take to
decriminalize copyright infringement in Canada.
3. Theoretical Justifications for Criminal Copyright Infringement
Criminal copyright infringement has been justified on the following theoretical
bases: First, as Penney suggested, Criminal Legal Theory may justify criminalization on
the grounds that copyright infringement is immoral and causes harm to both content
creators, and society by diminishing the incentive to create. Second, as Hardy, the Task
Force, and the other Expansionists suggested, from a Law and Economic Theory
perspective, increased criminalization may adequately and effectively deter potential
infringers.
Hardy and other American expansionists suggested a third justification for
criminalized copyright enforcement. Property Legal Theory may justify criminalization
by treating copyright infringement as analogous to tangible property theft. From this
perspective, because theft is a criminal offence, copyright infringement should also be
treated as such. Finally, Moohr and Manta argued that Copyright Theory arguably
justifies criminalized infringement on the basis that it is necessary to achieve the proper
balance between authors’ and users’ rights.
These four theories provide the strongest justifications for criminalized copyright
infringement. In subsequent Chapters I disassemble and knock down the Criminal Legal
Theory, Law and Economic Theory and Property Theory justifications for criminalized
infringement. In particular, I argue that Criminal Theory does not justify criminalization
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because there is no societal consensus that copyright infringement is immoral,
infringement does not cause serious harm, and criminalization is not an “unavoidable
necessity” as required by the Doctrine of Restraint. Law and Economic Theory’s attempt
to justify criminalization on its deterrent value is also unsupportable. Criminalization
cause more harm than benefit, and therefore fails an efficiency-based cost-benefit
analysis. Property Theory also fails to justify criminalization because copyrights are not
property, and intangible and tangible properties are fundamentally different such that
copying intangible property is not analogous to tangible property theft.
I re-cast Copyright Theory as a positive case for non-criminal copyright
enforcement. Non-criminal enforcement is consistent with the dual objectives of the
Copyright Act and respects the need to balance the interests of authors and users. Existing
and future non-criminal enforcement mechanism, including Notice-and-Notice, and
digital locks, and Blockchain Technology, can effectively protect both authors and users
rights in a balanced manner. This approach is also consistent with Charter values, namely
the minimal impairment of Charter-protected rights. These theoretical analyses combine
to highlight the need to decriminalize copyright infringement in Canada during the 2017
copyright review process.
4. Chapter Summary
Although the authors canvassed above have, to varying degrees, made theoretical
references in their respective articles, no one has offered a systematic critique of
criminalized copyright infringement from a theoretical perspective. Penney led the
Canadian Scholars in terms of theoretical analysis. He incorporated some Copyright and
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Property Theory into his work, and provided a more detailed discussion of both Criminal
Legal Theory and Law and Economic Theory. However Penney’s theoretical analysis
was weakened by his unwillingness to discuss the differences between intellectual and
tangible property, and his failure to argue for decriminalization despite acknowledging
that Criminal Theory does not justify criminalized copyright infringement.
Vaver made a comparable mistake in his work. Despite continuously criticizing
the copyright regime for expanding authors’ rights and limiting users’ rights without
empirical or ethical support, and arguing for copyright reform, Vaver never took the final
step to argue for decriminalization, nor did he incorporate a systematic theoretical
analysis of criminalized infringement into his works. Similarly, both the sources involved
in the 1985 Copyright Act revision process, and the practitioners that have argued against
criminalized infringement all did not argue (to varying degrees) from a theoretical
perspective.
The American Scholars cannot escape the same critique. The skeptics, as a group
referenced some aspects of Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic Theory, Property
Theory, and Copyright Theory. However, they did not fully canvass each theory, none
addressed all four theories in one cohesive document, and they did not argue against all
forms of criminalized copyright infringement. The skeptics readily accepted that in some
circumstance, particularly commercial infringement, criminalization is necessary.
The expansionists argued for increased criminalization. Hardy’s theoretical
discussion was limited to Law and Economic Theory and Criminal theory. His theoretical
analysis was weakened by his assumption that criminalization increases deterrence, and
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his decision to explain away the lack of societal consensus on the immorality of copyright
infringement rather than accept that criminalization cannot be justified by Criminal Legal
Theory. Other than Hardy, the expansionists included little to no theoretical analysis in
their respective works. DuBose and the Task Force argued for increased criminalization
to remedy copyright “theft.” They analogized copyright infringement to theft of tangible
property without any theoretical justification or support for their assumption that
intangible and tangible properties were analogous.

Finally, Grimm et al. provided no

theoretical analysis in their work.
This thesis will address the need for a systematic analysis of criminalized
copyright infringement from a theoretical perspective. In Chapter 3 and 4 I will address
Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic Theory’s “deterrence” concept, and the
Property Theory of copyright. I will provide a short summary of the arguments that
support criminalization based on each theory, before knocking each of them down. In
Chapter 5 I make a positive case for non-criminal copyright enforcement. Again I provide
a short summary of the arguments that support criminalization before arguing that
Balance Theory and Charter values favour non-criminal copyright enforcement. In
Chapter 6 I conclude by articulating the necessary steps that the Canadian Government
must take to decriminalize (or at the very least avoid further criminalizing) the copyright
regime. This Chapter highlights the need for Canada to break free from American,
British, and international influences to finally realize a uniquely Canadian Copyright Act.
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Chapter 3 – Criminal Copyright Infringement is not
Justified by Criminal Legal Theory
In Chapter 2 I established that Criminal Legal Theory has been levied to justify
criminalized infringement on the basis that copyright infringement is morally wrong and
causes serious harm to both copyright owners and society. Proponents argue that
criminalized enforcement is necessary to deter potential infringers and prevent the harms
caused by copyright infringement. This necessarily implicates Law and Economic
Theory, and utilitarianism.191
A scholarly discussion of the immorality of copyright infringement is somewhat
lacking, given the apparent societal perspective that this conduct is not wrong.192
Whether copyright infringement is in fact immoral is open for debate. 193 There seems to
be a general consensus that commercial, for-profit infringement is morally wrong.194
However, the immorality of personal use infringement is less clear.195
Copyright infringement is said to cause harm to copyright authors through lost
revenue and loss of control over their work.196 Lost revenue occurs when the public
chooses to access a free, albeit unlawful, copy of the work rather than pay for a lawful
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copy.197 The aggregate harm of multiple unauthorized copies can be significant.198 Loss
of control occurs were copyright infringement deprives authors of their rights to produce,
perform, and publish their work, or limit access to it.199 Copyright infringement harms
society when it discourages creators from either creating new works, or making those
works available to the public. This can deprive the public of new ideas and information,
and ultimately undermine the entire copyright regime.200
From a Law and Economic Theory perspective, criminalization is the only way to
deter potential infringers and prevent the harms of copyright infringement. If left
undeterred, copyright infringement will likely “prove destructive to the country’s
production of intellectual output.”201 Whereas civil sanctions are arguably insufficient to
deter potential infringers because they are judgment proof (hard to detect online, unable
to satisfy civil judgment, etc.),202 criminal conviction has greater deterrence value and “is
197
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appropriate for activities that would otherwise be difficult to deter.”203 The threat of
criminal punishment, and criminally punishing infringers who do get caught, increases
deterrence.204 Criminal penalties become one of the “few effective responses” to
infringement.205
In this Chapter, I argue against both the Criminal Legal Theory and Law and
Economic Theory justifications for criminalized copyright infringement. Copyright
infringement is malum prohibitum, not malum in se: wrongful because statute says so, not
because it is inherently wrongful.206 In Part 1 I set the theoretical foundations for
criminalizing conduct. In doing so, I highlight the two predominant schools of thought on
crime, and two limitations on the State’s ability to assert the coercive power of the
Criminal Law: the morality school, the harm school, the harm principle, and the doctrine
of restraint. Those who follow the morality school typically believe that the Criminal
Law is meant to enforce existing morality; any act deemed immoral by society is properly
the subject of the Criminal Law.207 This is commonly known as the “morality principle.”
Conversely, those who ascribe to the harm school typically believe that the Criminal Law
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is only justified in enforcing morality insofar as it causes harm. This limit is commonly
known as the “harm principle.”208
In Part 2 I argue that Criminal Legal Theory and Law and Economic Theory
cannot justify criminalized copyright infringement, discrediting pro-criminalization
arguments throughout my analysis. I argue that copyright infringement does not meet the
minimum requirement of social immorality necessary to justify criminalization; that
although copyright infringement may cause some harm to copyright owners, this is not
serious enough to warrant criminalization; and that criminalized copyright infringement
fails a cost-benefit analysis.
In Part 3 I apply the Doctrine of Restraint to criminalized copyright infringement.
The Doctrine of Restraint is a further limit on the Criminal Law’s ability to enforce
morality. It suggests that criminal sanctions should only be used whether they are an
“unavoidable necessity.”209 I argue that because copyright infringement can be addressed
through non-criminal means, criminalized enforcement is not an unavoidable necessity.
I conclude in Part 4 that because Canada is a democratic society, criminalizing
conduct needs to be a Constitutionally valid exercise of State power pursuant to
s.91(27).210 To be legitimate, any criminalization must have some internal coherence that
would be recognized through some lens of legal theory. Because Criminal Legal Theory
and Law and Economic Theory are not effective lenses for this purpose, in subsequent
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chapters I will assess whether Property theory and Copyright Theory justify criminalized
infringement.
1. Criminal Legal Theory
Canadian Criminal Law is a created by both statute and common law. The
Criminal Code211 creates and defines the “specific part” i.e. offences, while the “general
part” i.e. mental elements and defences develop largely through the common law.212 The
majority of crimes are found in the Criminal Code, while others may be found in other
statutes, such as the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,213 the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act,214 and most relevant here, s.42 of the Copyright Act.215
The purpose of criminal law is to help maintain “a just, peaceful and safe society”
by developing a system that deals appropriately “with culpable conduct that causes or
threatens serious harm to individuals or society.”216 This purpose is achieved through a
primarily punitive framework that encompasses aspects of denunciation, deterrence,
incapacitation and rehabilitation.217 I will not discuss all of these aspects in detail,
however I will explore the concept of deterrence in Part 2B(ii).
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Criminal Legal Theory justifies criminalizing conduct, and can be both normative
and analytical.218 My focus is on normative theories that define what criminal conduct is
in Canadian society, and what it ought to be.219 While there is value in a purely analytical
approach to criminal law, my thesis goes beyond strictly analyzing the existence of
criminalized copyright infringement to argue for a particular outcome. This necessarily
involves some reliance on analytical theory to set the foundational values, goals, scope,
etc. that will ground the pursuit of non-criminalized infringement.
Retributive and consequentialist conceptions of harm and morality are typically
used to justify criminalization in Canada.220 Retributive theory is backward looking, and
posits that wrongful acts should be punished.221 Consequentionalist theory is forward
looking, and justifies punishment only where wrongdoing results in negative effects.222
Retributive and consequentialist theories are intertwined: both use punishment as means
to ensure justice for those wronged, to act as a deterrent, to denounce wrongful conduct,
to rehabilitate wrongdoers, and (where necessary) to incapacitate wrongdoers. 223 The
application of both theories within the justice system is limited by the fundamental rights
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of the wrongdoer as recognized in the Charter and reflected in the procedural
requirements of the Criminal Law.224
In the following sections I will address both the morality and harm justifications
for criminalization.225 The theoretical justifications for criminalization change depending
on which school of thought is adopted. Those who advocate in favour of the morality
justification do not ascribe to the harm principle; immorality is sufficient to warrant
criminalization. Proponents of the harm principle argue that criminalization can only be
justified by immorality and serious harm. Criminalization, then, requires at least immoral
conduct. I address both the immorality and harmfulness of copyright infringement in Part
2. In Part 3 I discuss the concept of deterrence, and arguments that criminalization deters
potential wrongdoers from engaging in immoral and harmful conduct.
A. The Morality Justification for Criminalization
Lord Devlin is one of the predominant voices of the Morality School. He argued
that criminal law is meant to enforce morality as such. Unlike the Harm School, Lord
Devlin argued that the State power to legislate against immorality cannot possibly be
limited by legal theory.226 The Criminal Law is fundamentally a moral system,227 built on
the foundations of what is considered right and wrong in a given community. 228 Immoral
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conduct is inherently wrong and should be criminalized;229 any act condemned by the
public on moral grounds is properly the subject of Criminal Law.230
A distinction is often drawn between public and private morality, where only the
former is subject to legal intervention.231 Public immoral conduct is defined by
fundamental social values, and can therefore differ from one community to the next.232
Fundamental social values can be subdivided into two categories: values generally
essential to the very existence of society, and values essential to the existence of a
particular society.233 Broadly speaking, “essential values are those without which social
life would be impossible.”234 These values include: the sanctity of life, the inviolability of
the person, the virtue of truth, and the necessity of order.235 They correlate to crimes of
violence, fraud, and crimes against the peace, order, and good governance of society. 236
The morality principle advocates that criminal responsibility should attach to
immoral acts as a means for society to maintain moral integrity, and reaffirm social
values.237 Crimes require both a prohibited (immoral) act and a requisite mental state, or
actus reus and mens rea, both of which are typically defined in the specific criminal
229
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provision itself, or a relevant section of the Criminal Code. While the requirement of an
unlawful act is straightforward, the mens rea requirement deserves some elaboration.
There are typically two broad types of mental fault – subject and objective.238
Subjective fault refers to what is in the accused’s mind at the time the prohibited act is
committed.239 The accused must have the “required guilty knowledge in relation to the
specified circumstances or consequences.”240 Subjective fault is easy to reconcile with the
Morality Principle; people who chose to engage in immoral activity should be held
criminally responsible. Objective fault is a lower standard, based on the reasonable
person. It requires “that a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have had the
required guilty knowledge or would have acted differently.”241 Criminal negligence is an
offence based on objective fault. 242 It requires a “marked departure” from the standard of
care.243 The Morality Principle can justify criminalizing negligence on the basis that
people are expected to meet the standard of care necessary to reaffirm social values.
Those who depart significantly from this standard of care are not moral actors, and
deserve criminal punishment.244
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B. The Harm Justification for Criminalization
John Stuart Mill, H. L. A. Hart, and Joel Feinberg are the predominant voices of
the Harm School.245 They believed that immorality alone is insufficient to justify the
State’s interference with individuals through the coercive power of the Criminal Law.
Mill famously stated, “the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.”246
Criminalization must be exercised with restraint because the Criminal Law is a serious
restriction on our inherent right to act in accordance with our will.247 The Criminal Law
“out to be reserved for reacting to conduct that is seriously harmful.” 248 This begs the
question: “what constitutes harmful conduct?”
The “harm” concept is open to wide variation and interpretation.249 Harm
generally refers to “a set-back to a person’s interests, measured with respect to some
baseline.”250 Feinberg defines criminally recognizable harm as “setbacks of interests that
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are wrongs, and wrongs that are setbacks to interests.”251 Criminally harmful conduct
includes: inflicting harm, or threatening to inflict harm, to the physical safety or integrity
of an individual; interference with an individual’s property; and, threatening the
collective “safety or integrity of society,” through direct damage or “undermining…
fundamental or essential values.”252 Mill limited criminal harm at the individual; he
argued that the harm principle did not apply to strictly personal conduct.253 Criminal
conduct must interfere with at least one other member of society; “in the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.”254 For Mill, the use of
deterrence is only justified where the un-deterred conduct is “calculated to produce evil
to someone else.”255
The harm principle limits the State’s ability to enforce morality through the
Criminal Law. To be criminal, conduct must: (1) be morally wrong based on fundamental
social values, and (2) cause serious harm to someone other than the person engaging in
the conduct.256
Both schools of thought see immorality as a baseline requirement. Harm is an
additional requirement if we adopt the harm principle. Rather than endorse one school of
thought and limit my theoretical analysis of criminalized copyright infringement to their

251

Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) at 36.
Ibid at 45.
253
Mill, On Liberty, supra note 208 at 26.
254
Ibid.
255
Ibid.
256
The mens rea requirements discussed above also apply to the harm principle. Subjectively, people who
chose to engage in harmful conduct should be punished. Objectively, those who depart from the standard of
care expected of all citizens to the extent that it causes harm to others should also be punished.
57
252

understanding of crime, in Part 2 I will discuss both the immorality and harm of
copyright infringement.
2. Criminal Legal Theory does not Justify Criminalized Infringement
Having established the theoretical justifications for criminalization, I now shift
into an argument that neither Criminal Legal Theory, nor Law and Economic Theory
justify criminalized infringement. I argue that copyright infringement does not meet the
minimum requirement of immorality and it does not cause the requisite level of harm to
warrant criminalization. I also argue that the deterrence justification for criminalization is
weak, and on balance, the harms of criminalization outweigh its potential benefits. In Part
3, I build on this position and argue that the doctrine of restraint supports the argument
against criminalized copyright infringement.
A. There is no Consensus that Copyright Infringement is Immoral
As outlined above, morality is based on fundamental social values. To criminalize
copyright infringement on the basis of morality, the protection of creators’ copyright
interests must amount to at least one fundamental social value.257 An argument could be
made that copyright infringement invokes the virtue of truth, and correlates to the crime
of fraud. However, the United States Supreme Court, in a manner consistent with
Canadian law and statutory interpretation, has ruled that copyright infringement is not
fraud.258 They reasoned that copyrights are statutorily defined and distinct from
possessory interests to tangible property, that copyright infringement does not deprive an
257

Recalling from above that fundamental social values include: the sanctity of life, the inviolability of the
person, the virtue of truth, and the necessity of order, and correlate to crimes of violence, fraud, and crimes
against the peace, order, and good governance of society.
258
See e.g. Dowling v United States, 473 US 207 (1985) at 216 – 17.
58

owner of physical control, and that infringement implicates more complex interests than
theft, conversion, or fraud.259
We must consider, then, whether the inviolability of copyright a fundamental
value, and ascertain what society’s view of copyright infringement is.260 These
considerations beg for a definition of society. For the purposes of this thesis, I am
defining “society” as the aggregate of people living in Canada. However I will note that
society is not a homogenous group with unified interests. Any discussion of copyright
infringement typically divides between authors and users, however this is an
oversimplification.261 Not all copyright authors share the same beliefs about copyright.
For example, in 2007 Radiohead released In Rainbows on their website, asking fans to
“pay what you wish.”262 Large record companies would likely not be onboard with this
business model.263 Similarly, not all users share the same beliefs about copyright
protection and infringement.264
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In this section I will not prove that copyright infringement is moral; I do not have
that burden. Onus is on the Government to justify criminalization.265 Part of that
justification is proving that copyright infringement is immoral. In the absence of proof,
and considering the ongoing debate of copyright infringement’s immorality, the
Government cannot justify criminalized infringement on the basis of morality.266 The
morality principle requires evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the majority
of society believe copyright infringement is immoral. There is insufficient data to support
this conclusion.
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i) Survey Data Shows no Societal Consensus that Copyright Infringement is Immoral
I have been unable to find any Canadian surveys that directly ask whether
copyright infringement is immoral. Conducting and empirical study is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this thesis, so I am left to expand my search beyond the Canadian
border. There are three surveys from the U.S. and one Danish study that speak to this
issue.. Stuart P. Green and social psychologist Matthew Kugler conducted an empirical
study in 2010 with the objective of determining whether society agrees that the means by
which “theft” is committed and the form of the stolen property is irrelevant to
blameworthiness and punishment.267 Green believes their study is evidence that “lay
observers draw a sharp distinction between file sharing and genuine theft.”268 Their data
shows that “theft” of tangible goods is seen as more blameworthy than theft of intangible
goods: “All else being equal, our subjects consistently ranked the theft of tangible goods
as more blameworthy than theft of intangibles.” 269
Robert M. Siegfried released “Student attitudes on software piracy and related
issues of computer ethics” in 2005.270 Siegfried surveyed 224 students from two
American universities. They were asked questions relating to their perception of software
piracy, and their attitudes about downloading music, among others.271 Siegfried observed,
267
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“it is very clear that students do not see any problem with downloading music over the
internet. The permission of the artist… is insignificant.”272 According to Siegfried’s data,
82% of those surveyed “think it’s ok to download music from the Internet,” while 84%
“think it’s ok to download music from the Internet if the musicians say it’s OK.”273
The Pew Research Centre conducted a survey on downloading music in 2000.274
They found that 78% of those surveyed who downloaded music did not think it was
stealing.275 They found that a 53% majority of general internet users did not believe
downloading was stealing, while 31% said it was stealing.276 The study also found that
61% of the music downloader’s surveyed stated they did not care whether the music they
were downloading was protected by copyright.277
A Danish study released in 2010 shows a similar trend. 278 The study contained
questions on morals and ethics, and asked participants which laws they believed were
socially acceptable to break.279 The study shows that 70% of those surveyed find
unauthorized downloading to be socially acceptable.280 A 1997 study had similar
results.281
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industry’s “extra aggressive” efforts to “crack down” on, and educate the public about
unauthorized file sharing, societal consensus that copyright infringement is not immoral
has remained unchanged.282 This trend also speaks to the law’s inability to teach
morality.283
These surveys do not definitively conclude that copyright infringement is not
immoral form a societal perspective.284 However, they do show that there is no general
consensus that copyright infringement is immoral, despite lobbying efforts to suggest
otherwise.285
Part of the push to view copyright infringement as morally wrong is based on the
false assumption that it is analogous to theft, which I address in detail in Chapter 4.
Briefly, the immorality of theft is not heavily contested (in most situations).286 If
copyright infringement is seen as analogous to theft, then it is easy to say that it is
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morally wrong and should be criminalized.287 However, because society does not equate
copyright infringement with taking physical property,288 contrary to what the recording
industry and other large scale lobbying groups would have us believe,289 copyright
infringement cannot be criminalized on the basis that it is analogous to theft of tangible
property.290 As Green & Kugler argue, “where people consistently regard two or more
types of conduct as different in terms of blameworthiness, the law ought to reflect those
differences.”291
As Penney and others have suggested, copyright infringement is malum
prohibitum, not malum in se.292 Copyright infringement is, technically speaking, an
illegal act, but this is only because the Government and the Copyright Act says that it is.
This does not settle the dispute as to whether copyright infringement is morally wrong. In
fact, Canada has a history of criminalizing conduct at odds with society’s moral compass,
for example same-sex relationships.293 In these situations the law is being used in an
attempt to teach society values, rather than as a reflection of established fundamental
values. This is a theoretically invalid purpose; the Criminal Law is meant to enforce
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morality, not teach it; teaching morality is society’s responsibility. 294 When society fails
to meet this responsibility, it is inappropriate to “fruitlessly pin all our hopes on criminal
law. Law cannot do it all, nor should it be ask it to.”295
B. Criminalization is More Harmful than Copyright Infringement
In this Part I make two arguments. First, I argue that the types of harm typically
attributed to copyright infringement are insufficient to warrant criminalization. Second, I
argue that the deterrence justification for criminalization fails a cost-benefit analysis.
i) Copyright Infringement does not Cause the Requisite Level of Harm.
There are generally three types of harm attributed to copyright infringement: (1)
harm to copyright owners through lost revenue, (2) harm to copyright owners through
lost control over their work, and (3) harm to society through lost incentive to create,
which deprives the public of innovative and creative works. While each of these
categories may involve some degree of harm, it is not serious enough to justify criminal
sanctions. This is especially true where there is no societal consensus that copyright
infringement is morally wrong for violating fundamental social values.
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First, the harms associated with copyright infringement are often times hard to
quantify, and typically over stated.296 Whereas there is minimal data available on the
immorality of copyright infringement, there is minimal objectively quantifiable data on
the harm caused by copyright infringement. In 2012 the RCMP released Intellectual
Property Crime Statistics for 2005 – 2012.297 This report details the value of
counterfeited good seized from 2005 – 2012.298 It lists the types of commodity seized in
2012 by percentage and total retail value.299 In 2012, “audio-visual and copyright works”
represented 20% of the total documented cases of counterfeit and pirated goods. The total
retail value of all items seized in 2012 was $38,102,195.00, the Report does not
breakdown this value by commodity, and there is no way of determining what percentage
of this value is attributable to copyright infringement. Despite numerous searches, this is
the only objective report that I was able to uncover, and it does not explicitly state the
financial harm caused by copyright infringement, nor does it indicate what percentage of
the $38 million represents lost revenue.
Lost revenue is difficult to quantify. One way to calculate the loss is by
multiplying the value of the protected content by the number of infringing copies created.
If an album download is $10, Infringer X makes it available online and 40 people
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download an infringing copy, then the copyright owner loses $400 in revenue. The
problem with this approach to lost revenue, is that it potentially overestimates the harm. It
does not account for the fact that some people who downloaded a free copy would have
never paid $10 for the album. If Downloader Y was never going to pay for the album in
the first place then the copyright owner has not actually lost any revenue.
In 1996, the Nova Scotia Provincial Court sentenced a 17 year-old young
offender, J.P.M. to 18 months probation and 150 hours of community service for criminal
copyright infringement.300 J.P.M ran an online bulletin board that hosted copyright
protected software and allowed users to download the software for free. 301 Sixteen users
were granted access to the content, and J.P.M. also downloading some of the software to
his friends’ computers himself. Unfortunately, the lower court decision is unreported. The
Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence of the lower court. The Court of
Appeal decision makes no reference to the alleged financial loss suffered by the software
companies as a result of J.P.M’s bulletin board, or any indication of the financial profit he
received. In spite of this, the lower court notes, J.P.M’s actions were “clearly prejudicial
to the owners of the copyright in that they were deprived of control over their product
which they required to ensure quality and also interferes with a legitimate commercial
distribution and sale of the product for profit.”302
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The lost revenue argument is often based on the concept of “aggregate harm.”303
The harm caused by one infringer may be insignificant, for example where they
download a single song from the internet. The cumulative harm of multiple infringers
downloading the same song has the potential to significantly affect copyright owner’s
financial interests.304
Another method used to quantify copyright owner’s financial harm looks to the
profits of the alleged infringer. The accusations against Kim Dotcom et al. provide a nice
example.305 Dotcom et al have been accused of depriving copyright owners of upwards of
$500,000,000. Their estimated income is in excess of $175,000,000.306 The United State
Department of Justice argues that this revenue is evidence of their wrongdoing and that
Dotcom et al. have “financially benefitted directly from the infringement of copyrighted
works.”307 Similarly, Artem Vaulin, the alleged proprietor of KickAss Torrents is alleged
to have illegally distributed $1 billion worth of copyright right protected content, and is
alleged to make between $12-22 million per year in advertisement revenue.308
This focus on profit is not surprising, as criminal copyright infringement requires
a potential financial deprivation to the copyright owner, be it through a sale, rental, or
trade by the copyright infringer.309 However using an infringer’s profit as a measure of
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harm and lost revenue is problematic because it assumes a direct correlation between the
two. Neither Dotcom’s indictment nor the Vaulin complaint explains how the Department
of Justice calculated the copyright owners lost revenue.
Second, the harm associated with loss of control is insufficient to justify
criminalization. While the Copyright Act does give authors the right to control access,
reproduction and dissemination of their work,310 these rights are not absolute. Authors’
rights are limited by users rights, which are also codified in the Copyright Act,311 and
allow certain content uses outside of the author’s control. Authors are also able to
maintain an allowable degree of control over their work through non-criminal means,
such as Digital Rights Management (DRM) and TPMs.312
Third, whether copyright infringement actually causes harm by undermining the
incentive to create is impossible to calculate. Burleson argues, “the apocalyptic rhetoric”
that copyright infringement will destroy the creation incentives is unsupportable; Filesharing has continued for over a decade and new artists continue to emerge and
thrive.”313
Assuming that infringement does undermine the incentive objectives is
problematic. Whether the copyright regime actually incentives creation is up for
debate.314 It is bad practice to base criminalization on such a contested premise. If the
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copyright regime does not actually incentivize creation, and we base criminalized
infringement on the premise that it undermines the incentive to create – thereby depriving
society of knowledge and information – then in effect we are criminalizing conduct that
does not actually disrupt the copyright regime, and therefore, in reality, does not cause
harm to society.
Additionally, copyright infringement does not cause physical harm. The harm
involved is typically described as purely financial, though some scholars suggest that
copyright infringement also harms the morality and sensibility of creators.315 While it is
possible that creators are emotionally harmed by copyright infringement, this type of
wrong is more appropriately addressed by civil and tort law rather than government
intervention through the Criminal Law.316
ii) The Deterrence Justification for Criminalization is Weak.
Law and Economic Theory has a history with Intellectual Property Law. 317
Traditionally its focus is on reconciling production inventive and access. 318 I am
particularly focused on Law and Economic Theory’s criminalization justification – that
criminalization is the only effective way to deter the harms of copyright infringement. 319
The chief economic rationale for criminalized infringement is the “expectation that
argue that “copyright’s origin story,” the “incentivist narrative” is not true; that creators create for reasons
other than financial gain. They also argue that copyright owners feel wronged by copyright infringement
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deterring some harmful copyright will generate more beneficial behavior.”320 To assess
this claim, I am adopting a utilitarian lens.321 I invoke Kaldor-Hicks efficiency322 and
apply a cost-benefit analysis to show that the costs criminalized copyright infringement
outweigh its potential benefits.
Criminalized infringement may have some deterrent benefits. It may increase
public awareness that copyright infringement is illegal, which could reduce the rate of
infringement. In Chapter 5, I argue that this educative benefit is being effectively
achieved through the Notice-and-Notice regime. The risk of criminal sanctions may deter
potential infringers who believe “the contemplated wrong “costs” more than it is
worth.”323 This is a form of External Control Theory.324 However, this reasoning assumes
that potential infringers will act in rationally calculated ways, which is increasingly
untrue online.325 It also fails to account for the fact that “it is more difficult to induce law320
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abiding behavior when underlying social norms do not support the law.”326 Because
copyright infringement’s immorality is not an underlying social norm, it is unlikely that
increased criminalization will be an effective deterrent.
Criminalized infringement comes with significant costs. First, criminalized
enforcement has direct monetary costs associated with detection, enforcement,
prosecution and sanction, which can be significant.327 Second, it undermines Copyright
Law’s objectives by overdeterring lawful uses of copyright protected content. These
chilling effects undermine both the incentive and access objectives. The former is
undermined as users are deterred from building on existing works to develop new
socially valuable content. The latter is undermine too, as users are deterred from lawfully
accessing content out of fear that their use may be considered illegal.328 Buccafusco &
Masur acknowledge that there is an “efficient level of copying,” where some copyright
may be socially beneficial.329 In some circumstances copyright infringement may actually
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increase the popularity and recognition of a particular work, benefitting the copyright
owner.330
Criminalized infringement also harms the integrity of the criminal justice
system.331 As discussed above, there is no societal consensus that copyright infringement
is immoral. Criminalizing and punishing behaviors that society does not believe are
wrong “jeopardizes the law’s legitimacy and credibility.” 332 It may also produce a
counter effect, whereby society sees no benefit in complying with the criminal law,333
which could undermine society’s ability to ever see copyright infringement as
immoral.334
The justice system’s integrity is further jeopardized by the “aggregate harm”
approach to punishing copyright infringers. This approach attributes the harm of multiple
small de minimus infringements to one infringer and punishes them accordingly.335 This
is done because copyright infringers are often hard to detect, and those who are
charged/convicted are used as a means of general deterrence. This approach not only
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violates the proportionality principle, but deterrence is also ineffective for increasing
legal compliance.336
On balance, the costs of criminalized infringement significantly outweigh its
benefits.337 I am not suggesting that copyright infringement does not cause harm.
However the harm caused to the copyright regime and the integrity of the criminal justice
system by criminalization is far greater than the harm to copyright owners through
potential lost revenue and lost control over their work.338 As such, the deterrence
justification for criminalization is weak.
3. Criminalized Infringement is Inconsistent with the Doctrine of Restraint.
The doctrine of restraint is a further limit on the State’s ability to use the Criminal
Law’s coercive power to enforce behaviour.339 Both the Law Reform Commission and
the Department of Justice heavily discussed this doctrine during the 1982 Criminal Code
amendment process.340 The doctrine of restraint’s proponents argue that because the
Criminal Law is a “blunts instrument,” with punitive and coercive sanctions, restraint
must be exercised in classifying conduct as criminal.341 The doctrine argues for a careful
examination of the “appropriateness, the necessity, and the efficacy of employing the
336
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criminal law.”342 Criminal sanctions should not be used where there are less coercive
means available to address social problems;343 and criminal sanctions are only
appropriate whether they are an “unavoidable necessity.”344 From this perspective, the
Criminal Law is limited in scope and function.345
The doctrine of restraint has been given minimal attention from both sides of
criminalized copyright infringement debate. Scott & Collins briefly discussed both the
Law Reform Commission and Department of Justice’s comments in their work, noting,
“the criminal offence provisions of the Copyright Act… do not fall within the Law
Reform Commission’s classification of “criminal” acts.”346 Instead, they are “individual
economic rights, the protection and enforcement of which should be the responsibility of
the rights holders themselves.”347
The doctrine of restraint has yet to be used to justify criminalized infringement. I
suspect that it may be argued that criminalization is an absolute necessary because civil
sanctions are ineffective.348 However, even if copyright infringement was immoral and
cause serious, quantifiable harm, the doctrine nevertheless supports arguments against
criminalization. Criminalized infringement does “not fall within the Law Reform
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Commission’s classification of “criminal” acts.”349 Copyrights are “individual economic
rights, the protection and enforcement of which should be the responsibility of the rights
holders themselves.”350 Copyright infringement is a private, social problem; it is not a
public wrong, such that resort to Criminal Law and coercive state power is necessary or
legitimate.351 Resort to the criminal law is inappropriate where it cannot be justified by
Criminal Legal Theory; it is not necessary where there are other effective, non-criminal
enforcement mechanism;352 and, it is ineffective where it undermines the justice system’s
integrity and the Copyright Act’s objectives.353 Criminal copyright infringement is not
appropriate, necessary, effective, nor an unavoidable necessity.
4. Chapter Summary
In this Chapter I looked to Criminal Legal Theory to understand how
criminalization is justified. The morality principle explains that Criminal Law is used to
enforce moral behavior based on fundamental social values. Both the harm principle and
the doctrine of restraint limit the Criminal Law’s ability to enforce morality as such. The
harm principle asserts that criminalization is only justified where wrongdoing cause
serious harm, while the doctrine of restraint asserts that criminalization is only justified
where it is an unavoidable necessity. I also explored Law and Economic Theory and the
concept of using criminal penalties as a deterrence mechanism.
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I argued that Criminal Legal Theory and Law and Economic Theory cannot
justify criminalized copyright infringement. There is no societal consensus that copyright
infringement is morally wrong. There is minimal empirical data available on the
morality/immorality of copyright infringement. The data that is available suggests that
the majority of those surveyed do not think copyright infringement is immoral. In the
absence of data capable of proving societal consensus that copyright infringement is
morally wrong, the government is unable to justify the need for criminal laws to police
copyright infringement pursuant to Criminal Theory or the Criminal head of power in the
Constitution.354
Although copyright infringement may cause financial harm to copyright owners
in some circumstance, this harm is not sufficiently serious to justify criminalization. At
most, copyright infringement cause purely financial, non-physical harm to copyright
owners. Copyright infringement may actually benefit copyright owners in some
circumstances. The deterrent value of criminalization is also questionable. Deterrence
does not work where society has not internalized copyright infringement’s immorality.
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Criminalization may also cause harm where it over deters lawful conduct, and
undermines the objectives of the Copyright Act.
I concluded that even if copyright infringement was immoral, seriously harmful,
and criminalization was an efficient deterrent, the doctrine of restraint nevertheless
supports arguments against criminalized infringement. As I outline in detail in Chapter 5,
copyright infringement can be effectively enforced through non-criminal mechanisms.
Criminalization is therefore not an unavoidable necessity.
Neither Criminal Legal Theory nor Law and Economic Theory justify
criminalized infringement. With this conclusion I must move on to consider whether
other theories can justify criminalization. In Chapter 4 I turn to Property Legal Theory
and unpack the argument that copyright infringement is theft. The property theory of
copyright fails to justify criminalization because copyrights are not property, tangible and
intangible property are not analogous and copyright infringement is not theft. In Chapter
5 I argue that non-criminal copyright enforcement is consistent with Copyright Legal
Theory and the Charter. This leads me to conclude in Chapter 6 that criminalized
infringement cannot be justified and the Canadian copyright regime should therefore be
decriminalized.
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Chapter 4 – Property Legal Theory does not Justify
Criminalized Copyright Infringement
Property Theory is used to justify criminalization on the basis that copyrights are
property. Because unlawfully taking property is theft, copyright infringement must also
be theft. The invocation of theft-language is a rhetorical strategy. Theft is widely
accepted as a criminal offence. By calling copyright infringement theft, proponents of
criminalized infringement are able to bypass the fact that criminalization cannot be
justified by Criminal Legal Theory.
DuBose’s use of theft discourse is heavy handed. He repeatedly refers to
copyright infringement as “theft” and infringers as “thieves” and “pirates.”355 Although
he does not bother to propose or explain a property theory of copyright unlike Hardy and
the Sub-Committee, we can infer from his discourse that he sees copyrights as property.
Hardy argues that there are no inherent and logical differences between tangible and
intangible property “for the purposes of the legal regime of property ownership.”356 He is
saying that copyrights, intangibles, are legally equivalent to property, tangibles. It follows
that because taking tangible property is theft, taking intangible property should also be
theft. The Sub-Committee views copyrights in similar ways to Hardy. Not only do they
reject the proposition that intellectual property rights are different from tangible property
rights, they also assert, “ownership is ownership is ownership.”357 They argue that
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copyright ownership is the same as land ownership.358 The Sub-Committee’s use of
“theft” and “piracy” discourse in reference to copyright infringement invokes an image of
tangible property.359
Both Goldman and Buccafusco & Fagundes highlight the effect “theft” and
“pirate” discourse has on perceptions of copyright infringement. Goldman argues that
comparing copyright infringement to shoplifting creates a “scope problem” by treating
every infringing copy as “a criminally cognizable loss.”360 This results in an
overstatement of copyright owners’ harms, and extends the boundaries of criminal
copyright law too far.361 Buccafusco & Fagundes argue that the metaphors used to
critique unauthorized uses of copyrighted works indicate which moral foundations are
involved.362 Comparing copyright infringement to theft triggers the authority/subversion
foundation, concepts of respecting authority, and fear for social stability. 363 The authors
argue that equating unauthorized copying with theft “raises concern that more than just a
formal legal violation has occurred. … It suggests that the infringing conduct threatens
the stability of the social order.”364 Referring to copyright infringers as pirates has a
similar effect.365
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Those who blindly equate copyright infringement with theft fail to realize that
although invoking a theft metaphor achieves the desired outcome of seeing copyright
infringement through a criminal lens, it does not mean that copyright infringement in
itself is, or should be, a criminal act. Copyright infringement is literally, legally,
philosophically, and cognitively different than theft.366 In this Chapter I argue against the
property theory of copyright, and the justification of criminalized infringement through
analogy tangible property theft.
Analogizing copyrights to property is at worst “an inaccurate and manipulative
distortion of legal and moral reality,”367 and at best a rhetorical exercise.368 The analogy
seeks to shift the discussion away from what rights are statutorily granted by the
Copyright Act to a discussion of how copyright infringement is equivalent to theft.369 In
Part 1 I argue that although copyrights have property-like characteristics, they are not
property; they are legal rights. This argument is supported by the fact that the Copyright
Act refers to copyrights as “rights,” not “property. Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Canada has repeatedly stated that exceptions to copyrights are “users rights,” not
“exceptions to property use.” The concept of users rights is readily accepted in the
literature by leading Canadian copyright scholars.370 The existence of users rights, and
366
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the fact that copyrights are limited in time and scope by the Copyright Act, means
copyrights are neither exclusive nor absolute, unlike property.
In the alternative, I argue in Part 2 that even if we adopt a property theory of
copyright, copyright infringement is not theft.371 The analogy between tangible and
intangible property is not sound. Contrary to what Hardy argues, there are both inherent
and logical differences between tangible and intangible property. 372 In particular,
intangible property is non-rivalrous; one person’s consumption of intangible property
does not make it unavailable to others.373 As a result, intangible property does not need
the same protections as tangible property.
In Part 3 I argue that the property justification for criminalization is circular.
Tangible property theft is criminal. This is largely accepted in Canadian society. For
copyright infringement to equal theft, copyright must be property. But, in equating
copyright infringement to theft, the premise that copyright is property is assumed, rather
than proven.
I conclude in Part 4 that like Criminal Legal Theory and Law and Economic
Theory, Property Legal Theory also fails to justify criminalized copyright infringement,
necessitating the need to consider additional theories.
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1. Copyrights are not Property; they are Legal Rights.
Conceptualizing “copyrights” as “property” is a stretch.374 Vaver suggests that
neither the “intellectual” nor the “property” component of Intellectual Property “can be
taken too seriously.”375 Just because copyright is labeled a form of “intellectual property”
does not mean that either the “intellectual” or “property” components “do or should
exist.”376 Rather than blindly relying on an abstract title to define copyrights as property,
we should instead focus on the legislative content of copyrights. In doing so, we
recognize that copyrights are better understood as a specific set of legal rights that exist
in opposition to user rights, rather than property. We also recognize that to achieve the
Copyright Act’s objectives, copyrights do not need to be as extensive as ordinary property
rights.377
The common conception of property as a bundle of rights can be applied to
copyrights. The Copyright Act does grant creators a certain “bundle” or rights. These
rights do share some of property’s characteristics: they can be “valued, located, bought
and sold, licensed, and used to obtain credit,” among others.378 However, the rights
granted by the Copyright Act are fundamentally different than the rights that we typically
associate with property ownership. As Vaver notes, “IP gets and expects less respect than
land and goods… IP is nothing like land or goods.” The Copyright Act provides relevant
insight into the differences between copyrights and property.

374

Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 11 at 9. Vaver makes this statement about IP generally.
Ibid at 13.
376
Ibid.
377
See Penney, “Crime, Copyright, and the Digital Age,” supra note 5 at 22.
378
Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 11 at 8.
83
375

A. The Copyright Act: “Rights;” not “Property.”
In some circumstances it can be safely assumed that if a certain event had
occurred, evidence of it could be discovered by qualified investigators. In
such circumstances it is perfectly reasonable to take the absence of proof
of its occurrence as positive proof of its non-occurrence.379
Copyrights are not property. While it may be difficult to prove a negative, a close
examination of the Copyright Act’s language helps us to understand what copyrights are.
Because the Copyright Act provides an exhaustive definition of copyrights, if the notion
that copyrights are property is valid, then we should expect to see some indication of this
in the Act. The absence of evidence in the Copyright Act to support the notion that
copyrights are property, combined with a lack of Supreme Court decisions on the topic
should be determinative. However, as I discuss in more detail below with respect to
“exceptions” and “users rights,” the Copyright Act’s language is subject to interpretation
by the Court. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that copyrights are not property:
…copyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is
statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights in property or conduct
nor falls between rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common
law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the
terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute (emphasis added).380
The Copyright Act, as the name suggests, deals with copyrights. Copyrights are a
specific set of actions that authors are allowed to do. They are defined in section 3(1) of
379
380
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the Act as, “the sole rights to produce or reproduce… perform… publish the work or any
substantial part thereof.”381 Section 3(1) contains a list of specific illustrations of these
rights in subsections (a) – (j).382 The Copyright Act also stipulates that “copyright shall
subsist” in an original work under the specific conditions listed in section 5(1).383 It does
not state that “property rights” shall subsist in the work.
Nowhere in the Act does it specifically refer to these rights as property. In fact,
the word “property” is only used in the Act five times.384 None of these five uses of
“property” are done in a manner to suggest that the Act intends for copyrights to be
property. In sections 14.2(2)(c) and 17.2(2)(c), the Act states that “moral rights” pass on
similarly to property where the creator or performer dies intestate.385 In section
32.1(1)(c), “property” is part of the title of the Cultural Property Export and Import
Act.386 Sections 38(1)(b) and 44.12(9) use “property” in the context of recovering
possession of unlawful copies (and plates used to make infringing copies in 38(1)).387 In
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these provisions “property” is used in references to taking physical possession of
infringing copies (and plates); it does not say that copyrights are property.
B. The Copyright Act: “Exceptions to infringement” not “Exceptions to Property
Use.”
The Copyright Act refers to copyrights – what authors are allowed to do with
copyright protected works – and “exceptions to infringement” – lawful uses of copyright
protected works.388 Because what the Act grants to authors are copyrights and not
property, it follows that the exceptions, which have come to be seen as “users rights” are
exceptions to rights, not exceptions to property.
The Copyright Act does not define “exceptions” in relation to property use. It
defines “exceptions” in relation to copyright infringement. “Exceptions,” as used in the
Copyright Act refers to acts that would otherwise constitute infringement pursuant to
section 27.389 Copyright infringement is defined as doing “anything that by this Act the
owner of the copyright has the right to do” without their consent.390 In other words, a user
infringes copyright when they reproduce, publish or perform a work without the
copyright owners consent, unless their action is an exception to infringement, as defined
in sections 29 – 32.2.
C. Copyrights are neither Exclusive nor Absolute.
The Copyright Act facilitates a final attack on the notion that copyrights are
property: copyrights are neither exclusive nor absolute.391 Because copyrights are
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statutorily created, the Copyright Act defines their scope and content, subject to the
Court’s interpretation of the Act.
Copyrights are limited in two specific ways. First, they are limited in time; they
last for the life of the creator plus 50 years.392 Once this limitation period has ended, the
work passes into the public domain and can be freely used. Conversely, property exists in
perpetuity and can be passed on through generations. Property never passes into the
“public domain.”
Second, copyrights are limited in scope. Copyright owners only have the rights
afforded to them by the Copyright Act, namely reproduce, perform or publish their
work.393 Property rights are generally absolute. In terms of real property, a fee simple is
the fullest possible ownership interest. While a fee simple can be divided into smaller
interests, such as a life estate and remainder, all of the rights to a particular parcel of land
must be assigned at all times; there can be no gaps in seisin.394 Copyrights are further
limited by users rights, which must be liberally interpreted. 395 Owners/creators rights
cannot be absolute or exclusive because they exist in opposition to users rights.396
Property does not contain similar “exceptions” or “users rights.” I, personally, do not
have a statutory right to enter onto or use your property for any reason without your
permission.397
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For these reasons, intellectual property, and copyright by association, has been
called “property carried to the highest degree of abstraction – a right in rem to exclude,
without a physical object or content.”398
2. The Analogy Between Theft and Copyright infringement is Unsound.
Alternatively, even if we accept that copyrights are property, the analogy between
property theft and copyright infringement is unsound. Theft and copyright infringement
are incompatible paradigms.399 Regardless of whether copyrights are property, they
cannot be the objects of theft pursuant Criminal Code section 322(1).400 Taking tangible
property is fundamentally different than unlawfully copying intangible property.
Two assumptions are necessary to criminalize copyright infringement on the basis
of theft: tangible and intangible property are analogous, and the correlative assumption
that copyright infringement and theft are analogous. Neither of these assumptions can be
supported. There are inherent differences between tangible and intangible property.
Comparing them is “an exercise in contrast more than anything else.”401 There are also
inherent differences in the legislative definitions of “theft” and “copyright infringement.”
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Together, these differences prevent the analogy that copyright infringement is theft. I will
discuss each analogy in turn
A. Tangible and Intangible Properties are not Analogous.
Tangible and intangible properties are not the same.402 “Tangible property” refers
to physical property that can be held in possession.403 Land, an MP3 player, a book, a car,
etc. are all forms of tangible property. “Intangible property” refers to property that is nonpossessory in nature; intangible property is an abstract entity, like the expression of an
idea.404 Intellectual property, and copyrights in particular, are intangible property.
There are some similarities between tangible and intangible property. Both types
of property can be owned, valued, bought, and sold.405 However there are significant
differences between the two types of property. The main difference is that intangible
property is non-rivalrous, and therefore not a scarce resource.406 Unlawfully copying
intangible property “does not diminish the quantity or quality of the work available to the
author or others;” it cannot be over-consumed.407 On this point, Paul Goldstein has stated:
A loaf of bread, once eaten, is gone. But 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' once sung
and heard, is still available for someone else to sing and to hear. Countless
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fans can listen to the song, indeed copy it, without diminishing its
availability to anyone else who wants to sing or listen to or copy it.408
This is reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s famous quote, “[h]e who receives an idea from
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at
mine, receives light without darkening me.”409 Conversely, tangible property is rivalrous.
My consumption of tangible property makes it unavailable to you.410 Tangible property
therefore deserves strong protection through property rights, while intangible property
does not require the same degree of protection.411
B. Copyright Infringement is not Analogous to Theft.
Just as tangible and intangible properties are fundamentally different, so too are
copyright infringement and theft. Not only are the definitions of copyright infringement
and theft different, but the harms they cause are also different, and offenders are
subjected to different penalties upon conviction. I this sub-Part, I will address each of
these issues.
Both copyright infringement and theft are statutorily defined. Copyright
infringement is defined in section 27(1) of the Copyright Act as doing anything that the
Copyright Act says copyright owners have the right to do, without consent of the
copyright owner.412 Authors’ rights are defined in section 3(1) of the Copyright Act and
include the right to produce, reproduce, perform or publish the work. As discussed above,
408
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users’ rights limit authors’ rights. The “exceptions” in sections 29.9 – 32.2 of the act
detail situations that amount to producing, reproducing, performing, or publishing a
work, but nevertheless are not copyright infringements.413 Doing one of the permitted
acts in sections 29.9 – 32.2 is “not just taking advantage of a limitation, exception,
exemption, defence, ‘loophole,’ or gracious indulgence extended by the copyright
owner… [it] is exercising a right inherent in the balance the Copyright Act strikes
between owners and users.” Theft is defined in s.322(1) of the Criminal Code. A person
commits theft when they take or convert “anything, whether animate or inanimate,” with
requisite intent as outline in subparagraphs (a) – (d), fraudulently and without colour of
right.414
These definitions do not map nicely onto each other; they are not equivalent.415
What happens when someone infringes copyright is different from what happens when
someone commits theft. To say that copyright infringement is theft, “the law must
grapple with the question of what exactly is taken or stolen.” 416 The term “anything” in
s.322(1) can include intangibles.417 However to be theft, what is stolen must “(1) be
property of some sort; (2) be property capable of being (a) taken – … intangibles are
excluded; or (b) converted – …may be an intangible; (c) taken or converted in a way that
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deprives the owner of his proprietary interests.”418 Copyrights do not meet these
requirements. Copyrights cannot be taken or converted because their owner never suffers
deprivation.419
At most copyright infringement causes a potential reduction in profit, which is a
purely intangible harm.420 It does not deprive the owner of any proprietary rights, as theft
does. The Court clarified this point in Stewart:
Copyright is defined as the exclusive right to produce or reproduce a
work in its material form [s.3]. A mere copier of documents … does not
acquire the copyright nor deprive its owner of any part therefore. No
matter how many copies are made of a work, the copyright owner still
possesses the sole right to reproduce or authorize the reproduction of his
work. Such copying constitutes infringement of the copyright under s.17
[now s. 27] of the Act, but it cannot in any way be theft under the
criminal law.421
The United States Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Dowling.422 In holding
that copyright infringement is not theft, the Court explained that copyrights comprise “a
series of carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which the law affords
correspondingly exact protections.”423 As a result, copyright infringement does not
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implicate the same property interests as theft; an infringer cannot “assume physical
control over the copyright… nor… wholly deprive its owner of its use.”424
“Theft” connotes something more permanent and substantial than “infringement”
or “unauthorized use.”425 Saying property has been stolen means “its owner has not only
been denied the right to exclude others from use, but that he has also been denied the
right to possess and make full use of the property himself.426 Theft triggers both of these
requirements, copyright infringement does not. A creator does not lose their possessory
rights when their work has been unlawfully copied.427
Further, the significant penalty differences for criminal copyright infringement
and theft suggests they are different. Theft can be both an indictable or summary
conviction offence.428 Theft over $5000 is an indictable offence, punishable by up to ten
years imprisonment.429 Theft under $500 is a hybrid offence. On indictment it is
punishable by up to two years imprisonment, while there is no set penalty for summary
conviction.430 Comparatively, criminal copyright infringement can also be both an
indictable or summary conviction offence.431 On indictment, copyright infringers are
liable to a fine up to $1,000,000, up to five years imprisonment, or both. 432 On summary
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conviction, copyright infringers are liable for a fine up to $25,000, up to six months
imprisonment, or both.433
These penalties are incomparable. First, theft involves no monetary fines despite
basing the length of imprisonment on the value of the stolen property. Criminal copyright
infringement involves significant monetary fines, despite no mention of the value of harm
caused by the infringement. Second, on indictment, a thief may spend twice as long in
prison than someone convicted of indictable copyright infringement. Third, there is a
possibility that someone who steals $100,000,000 worth of CD’s will spend up to ten
years in prison, while someone who illegally downloads $100,000,000 worth of MP3’s
will spend only five years in jail, and be required to pay $1,000,000 in fines. Both people
may also be required to pay restitution pursuant to ss 732.1(3.1)(a), 738 or 742.3(2)(f) of
the Criminal Code.434 If the copyright infringer is ordered to pay restitution in addition to
fines, they could be required to pay a total of $2,000,000 and spend five years in jail,
while the thief will spend ten years in jail and pay a total of $1,000,000. These penalties
are drastically different, and undermine the parity principle.
The purpose and principles of sentencing are codified in s.718 of the Criminal
Code. Section 718.2(b) codifies the parity principle: “a sentence should be similar to
sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar
circumstances.”435 This principle suggests that if copyright infringement is akin to theft,
then the penalties for both crimes should at least be similar, if not identical. The fact that
433
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the penalties for theft and copyright infringement are drastically different undermines the
argument that copyright infringement is theft.
3. The Property Justification for Criminalization is Circular.
The property justification for criminalization is circular. It assumes that
copyrights are property because doing so makes copyright infringement per se theft, and
therefore criminal. Calling copyright infringement “theft” “assumes what is being argued
for – that it is theft.”436 It evades the need to prove that copyrights are property, and that
copyright infringement is harmful and immoral, and deserves criminal punishment.437
Two premises must be true for property theory to justify criminalized copyright
infringement. First, theft of property must be criminal. As I outline in Part 2(B) above,
theft is codified in s.322(1) of the Criminal Code and widely accepted as a criminal
offence.438 Second, copyright must be property. As I argued in Part 2(A), copyrights are
not property; they are legal rights. Those who argue for criminalized infringement
attempt to evade this fact by blatantly stating that copyright infringement is theft or
stealing and that infringers are thieves and pirates, without offering any proof to support
their statement.439
Calling copyright infringement “theft” does not make it a legal fact. Instead,
copyright infringement is called theft to “draw upon and mobilize the ordinary, almost
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instinctive response of ordinary people to dislike, distain and despise the unauthorized
user of copyright works as they would dislike, distain and despise the ordinary thief.”440
4. Chapter Summary
In this Chapter I tackled the Property Theory justification for criminalized
copyright infringement. I argued that although copyrights have property-like
characteristics, they are legal rights. The Copyright Act supports this conclusion. It refers
to “copyrights,” not “property,” and limits copyright both in time and scope. Conversely,
property exists in perpetuity; it is both absolute and exclusive.
In the alternative, I argued that even if copyrights are property, the analogy
between tangible and intangible property is not sound, which leads to correlative point
that copyright infringement is not theft. Unlike tangible property, intangible property is
non-rivalrous and not a scare resource. Copying intangible property does not physically
deprive the copyright holder of any proprietary rights, as does physically property theft.
Additionally, the statutory definitions of copyright infringement and theft are different, as
are their applicable penalties, which violate the parity principle in Criminal Law.
Finally, I argued that the Property Theory justification for criminalization is
circular and unsupported. While using rhetorical theft-language avoids the need to prove
that copyrights are property, and that copyright infringement is immoral and causes
sufficiently serious harm to warrant criminalization, it does not in fact mean that
copyrights are property or that copyright infringement should be criminalized. As Green
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rightfully acknowledges, “framing illegal downloading as a form of stealing doesn’t and
probably will never work.”441
In Chapter 5, I shift my theoretical lens to Copyright Legal Theory. I also shift my
analytical technique from a negative, attack-based approach to a positive one.
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Chapter 5 – Copyright Legal Theory & the Positive
Case for non-Criminal Enforcement of Copyright
Infringement
In previous Chapters I critiqued criminalized copyright infringement from the
perspectives of Criminal Legal Theory, Law and Economic Theory and Property Theory.
Now I make a positive case for non-criminal enforcement. I argue that non-criminal
enforcement is consistent with the underlying justifications of Copyright Law, that noncriminal enforcement mechanisms are effective, and that they are consistent with Charter
values.
In Part 1 I set out the predominant theoretical justification for Copyright Law:
Balance Theory. Canadian Copyright Law has a dual purpose: to provide an incentive for
authors, and to ensure public access through dissemination.442 These objectives often
contradict each other. Balance Theory posits that Copyright Law exists to balance the
competing interests of content authors, who want to profit from their work, and content
users, who want access to information.443 I argue that non-criminal enforcement is
consistent with Copyright Law’s justifications. Although some of the scholars referred to
in Chapter 2 argue that criminalized infringement is necessary to properly balance
authors and users interests, criminalization tips the scales too far in favor of authors
rights, to the significant detriment of copyright users.
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In Part 2 I argue that non-criminal copyright enforcement mechanisms are
effective. First, I discuss the Notice-and-Notice regime, an integral part of the Copyright
Modernization Act. There has been a significant decline in copyright infringement since
the Notice-and-Notice provisions came into force in 2015.444 Second, I address two
effective TPMs or DRMs: digital locks and Blockchain Technology. Digital locks allow
authors to control which users have access to their content, where they can
geographically access the content, and what uses they can make of the content.
Blockchain is a derivative of DRM technology. It can help copyright authors protect their
rights by requiring their digital signature for any use of their content, and keeping a timestamped registry of all authorizations.445 Notice-and-Notice, digital locks, and Blockchain
Technology are better suited than the criminal law to protect both authors’ and users’
rights.
Building on this foundation, I argue in Part 3 that non-criminal enforcement is
consistent with Charter values, particularly minimal impairment as recognized in section
1.446 To be minimally impairing, the limit on Charter-protected rights must be reasonably
tailored to the objectives of copyright protection and enforcement.447 If there are less
harmful means of achieving these objectives, then the enforcement provisions are not
minimally impairing.448 I argue that non-criminal copyright enforcement is less harmful
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than criminal enforcement, and consistent with the minimal impairment requirements of
section 1. This consistency reinforces my main argument that copyright infringement
should not be criminalized in Canada.
1. Copyright Legal Theory
Copyrights are creatures of statute.449 They are created, defined, and limited by
the Copyright Act. But the Copyright Act does not state the purpose of Copyright Law.450
Fortunately Copyright Legal Theory seeks to explain why the copyright regime was
created and what its objectives are. Overtime there have been different theories levied to
justify Copyright Law, including Moral Theory, Economic Theory, and Bargain
Theory.451 However, Balance Theory is widely accepted as the predominant justification
by both the Supreme Court of Canada and leading Canadian copyright scholars. 452 The
Supreme Court has stated:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting
the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the
little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the legislative objective. The impairment must be
“minimal”, that is, the law must be carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary.”
449
See e.g. Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 11 at 19. The Copyright Act 1985, supra note 5,
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Designs, 3rd ed (Ontario: Carswell, 2000) at 1 [Fox Canadian Law].
450
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451
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arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator… The proper
balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in
recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited
nature.453
Vaver makes a similar comment, “Since the eighteenth century it has been common in
Anglo-American theory to treat IP as the product of competing interests.” 454 He goes on
to quote Lord Mansfield, which is helpful here:
[We] must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the
one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of
the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of
their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.455
Balance Theory operates from the assumption that Copyright Law is a public
policy initiative,456 necessary to incentivize creation and insure public access to works
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“of the arts and intellect.”457 In order to achieve this dual purpose, copyrights cannot be
absolute; they are limited by the contours of the law.458 Not only does Copyright Law
grant certain rights to authors, such as the right to reproduce and distribute the work, it
also grants certain rights to users, such as fair dealing, and use for private study.459 From
this perspective, Copyright Law is justified as a balance between authors’ and users’
interests.460
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to interpret both authors and users
rights liberally to give effect to the dual purpose of Copyright Law.461 In Théberge the
majority acknowledged that the exceptions to copyright infringement contained in ss.2932.2 of the Copyright Act protect the public domain in both traditional and novel ways.462
The Court builds on this position in CCH, where they refer to the “exceptions” as “users
rights.”463 They articulate that users rights must not be interpreted restrictively to
457
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35, 2 SCR 283 [Rogers v SOCAN]; Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theater Association of Canada, 2012 SCC
102
458

“maintain the proper balance” between users and authors.464 In this way, users’ rights are
not loopholes.465 They are an integral part of the copyright regime. 466 Both authors and
users rights must “be given the fair and balanced reading that benefits remedial
legislation.”467 Failing to interpret both categories liberally will tip the balancing scales
too far in the direction of either authors or users rights, undermining the purpose of the
copyright regime.468
The Supreme Court’s re-labeling in CCH is important to the concept of balance,
as rights cannot be balanced against exceptions.469 Language that refers to users rights as
exceptions or limitations, “treats what owners can do as rights (with all that word
connotes), and what everyone else can do as indulgences, aberrations form some
preordained norm, activated to be narrowly construed and not extended.”470 This is
incompatible with the concept of balance; the scales start weighted in authors’ favour.471
A. Non-Criminal Enforcement is Consistent with Copyright’s Balance Theory
Vaver has argued that the copyright regime is shifting such that authors’ rights
seem to be continually expanding, while users rights become increasingly narrow. This
38, 2 SCR 376 [Re:Sound]) “provided an unequivocal affirmation that copyright exceptions… should be
treated as users’ rights… The user rights analysis affects virtually all copyright cases, forcing all courts to
ensure that there is a fair balance between the interests of creators and users.”
464
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465
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466
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necessary to ensure that copyright does not undermine the public policy objectives that it purports to
advance.”
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ignores the Supreme Court of Canada’s caution that balance, “lies not only in recognizing
the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature.”472 Criminalized
copyright perpetuates this trend by overprotecting authors’ rights. Whereas civil
enforcement is a private remedy between the copyright owner and user, resort to criminal
law brings the coercive power of the state into what is a private matter. This creates a
significant power imbalance between the Department of Justice, with all of their available
resources, and copyright users. It also creates a bias in copyright policy that emphasizes
protection over public use.473
Civil law is better equipped than the Criminal Law to balance the competing
interests at stake in the copyright regime. Whereas criminal enforcement may result in
chilling effects, such as reducing public use of copyrighted material, “civil laws can
achieve a better balance because they do not run the risk of overdeterrence.”474
Additionally, civil enforcement provides a direct remedy to creators, whereas criminal
remedies are indirect. Civilly, creators can be award statutory damages actual damages,
injunctions, etc.475 An offender convicted of criminalize copyright infringement is liable
to serve time in jail/prison, or pay a fine. Fines are not payable to the copyright owner;
rather they are paid to the Court.476 Criminalized infringement’s only potential benefit to

472

Théberg, supra, note 442 at paras 30-33.
See Moohr, “Defining Overcriminalization,” supra note 37 at 802.
474
Ibid.
475
See Copyright Act 1985, supra note 5, ss 34, 38.1.
476
In some circumstances, the offender may be required to pay restitution to the copyright owner pursuant
to Criminal Code, supra note 211, ss 732.1(3.1)(a), 738 or 742.3(2)(f).
104
473

copyright owners is through general deterrence, which I argued in Chapter 2 is
ineffective.477
Non-criminal enforcement is also consistent with the principle of technological
neutrality. Through the Copyright Modernization Act,478 and the Copyright Pentalogy,479
both the Legislature and the Supreme Court of Canada have incorporated the concept of
technological neutrality into Canadian Copyright Law.480 Technological neutrality
requires that unless Parliament indicates a contrary intent, the Copyright Act must be
interpreted in a way “that avoids imposing an additional layer of protections and fees
based solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user.” 481 In other words,
just because content is digitized does not mean it should be more heavily protected than
analogue content. “Copyright should not stand in the way of technological progress and
potentially impede the opportunities for greater access afforded by the internet through
the imposition of additional fees or restrictive rules that create extra user costs.”482
The internet has been repeatedly accused of facilitating large-scale copyright
infringement, and necessitating a resort to criminal law to protect authors’ rights.483 Mark
Bartholemew and John Tehranian argue this has induced “copyright panic,” which has
lead to a wave of copyright protectionism.484 Copyright panic manifests as increased
477
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legal protection for authors.485

Criminalized infringement is one example of this

manifestation. Both Hardy and the Sub-Committee argue through the lens of copyright
protectionism. Hardy argues that the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S.
Government agree that intellectual property is “vulnerable” such that increased penalties
are necessary to protect intellectual output.486 The Sub-Committee argues that because
“piracy costs copyright owners millions of dollars every year,” the “full force of the
criminal law” is needed to protect intellectual property.487
However, Carys Craig reminds us that technological neutrality is part and parcel
of the copyright balance: “If copyright in general requires this balance, then it must
surely follow that copyright in the digital era requires the preservation of this balance,
which must mean that the law should have the same effect… whether applied offline or
online.”488 This means that the Legislature cannot exponentially expand authors’ rights,
through resort to criminal law and increasing criminal penalties, simply because we are
operating in a digital realm.
In Part 2, I discuss three effective non-criminal enforcement mechanisms. Two of
these approaches, Notice-and-Notice and Digital Locks, already exist in the Copyright
Act.489 I highlight their proven effectiveness, and address potential adjustments to bring
ensure they provide balanced protection. The third mechanism, Blockchain Technology
485
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has yet to be applied to copyright. I outline how this novel technology may enforce
copyright more efficiently than existing laws or regulatory systems.
2. Non-Criminal Enforcement is Effective.
Copyright has been enforced by non-criminal means since the Statute of Anne.490
The majority of copyright infringement cases proceed through civil rather than criminal
courts.491 While there may be a valid argument that copyright infringers are potentially
judgment proof, this does not automatically mean that all non-criminal enforcement
mechanisms are ineffective. Just because a civil suit may not provide a financial remedy
to copyright owners does not mean that we should automatically resort to criminal
enforcement.
The non-criminal enforcement methods that I discuss in this Part have either been
proven to be effective, as is the case with the notice-and-notice approach, or have the
potential to be effective, as is the case with the technological approaches. 492 These
methods provide both front-end, and after-the-fact enforcement remedies to creators
without having to resort to costly litigation.493 They operate in a manner that is consistent
with Copyright Law’s dual purpose to incentivize and disseminate. They adequately
protect authors’ rights in a way that is consistent with users rights. In the following sub490
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Parts, I will explain Notice-and-Notice, DRM and digital locks, and Blockchain
technology, and address how each approach can effectively remedy (or prevent)
copyright infringement.
A. Notice-and-Notice
The Notice-and-Notice regime is codified in ss.41.25 – 41.27 of the Copyright
Act. It was incorporated into Canadian Copyright Law through the Copyright
Modernization Act in 2012. Parliament deferred the coming into force of these provisions
until January 2015 to allow for stakeholder consultations.494 However Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) voluntarily used the Notice-and-Notice regime for years before its
codification.495
Notice-and-Notice works as follows: first, a copyright owner (claimant) who
believes their copyrights are being infringed online sends a notice to the users’ ISP in
accordance with section 41.25 of the Copyright Act.496 The notice must identify the
claimant, the work infringed, the claimant’s copyrights/interests in the work, specify the
claimed infringement, and provide alleged infringers IP address or “electronic location,”
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among other requirements.497 Upon receipt of an infringement notice, the ISP has two
obligations.498 First, the ISP must forward the notice to the alleged infringer “as soon as
feasible,” and inform the claimant that the notice has been forwarded. 499 Second, the ISP
must retain records that identify the person associated with the IP address for at least six
months beginning the day they receive the claimant’s infringement notice.500 ISP’s may
be liable for statutory damages in the range of $5,000 - $10,000 for failing to perform
their obligations under the Notice-and-Notice regime.501
Users have two choices when they receive an infringement notice: they can
remove the allegedly infringing content, or they can leave it online and potentially face
litigation. If the User believes that they have not infringed copyright, that their use of the
copyright protected content is within the scope of their User rights, then they are likely to
leave the content online. However it may be the case that the User was unaware that their
use of the work constituted copyright infringement. In this case, the notice serves an
educational purpose and provides the User with an opportunity to remedy the situation
before potentially facing litigation. Geist notes, “unlike the content takedown or access
cut-off systems, the Canadian notice approach does not feature any legal penalties. The
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notices do not create any fines or damages, but rather are designed as educational tools to
raise awareness of infringement allegations.”502
The Notice-and-Notice approach is balanced, respecting both Users and Creators
rights, compared to the United State’s Notice-and-Takedown regime. The Notice-andTakedown procedure was passed into law as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
in 1998.503 In order to benefit from Safe Harbour provision and not be liable for copyright
infringement for hosting infringing content on their server, ISPs must act “expeditiously
to remove or disable access to material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject
of infringing activity.”504 In other words, once an ISP receives notice that content hosted
on their server allegedly infringes copyright, they must “takedown” the content,
otherwise they face liability for “monetary relief” as defined in s.512(k)(2). 505 While this
approach protects authors’ rights, it does not protect users’ rights. ISP’s are required to
remove the content, but are not required to notify the User of the alleged infringement.
Users are given no opportunity to defend their actions as a legitimate use of the
content.506
The Notice-and-Notice regime has proven to be effective in curtailing copyright
infringement. In 2011, during a Bill C-32 Committee discussion meeting, Rogers released
502
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data that 67% of notice recipients did not repeat-infringe after receiving their first notice,
and 89% did not repeat-infringe after receiving two notices.507 The Entertainment
Software Association of Canada provided similar data for 2010: 71% of notice recipients
did not re-post infringing content on BitTorrent systems.508 GEK TEK, a U.S.-based antipiracy firm, claims the Notice-and-Notice regime has caused “massive changes in the
Canadian market.”509 GEK TEK claims the following decreases in piracy rates across
various Canadian ISPs: Bell Canada – 69.6% decrease; Telus Communications – 54.0%
decrease; Shaw Communications – 52.1% decrease; TekSavvy Solutions – 38.3%
decrease; and Rogers Cable – 14.9% decrease.510 Although there is speculation that some
of these decreases may be attributed to CEG TEK’s inclusion of settlement demands in
their letters, Geist nonetheless states, “the evidence has long suggested that the notices
alone have an education effect that leads to a significant reduction in infringement.”511
Given the effectiveness of the Notice-and-Notice regime, some U.S. based
copyright owners have begun petitioning the Government to adopt a similar approach.512
In 2015, the Internet Security Task Force, a group of “small businesses banding together
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to protect content creators and consumers from the negative effects of piracy” strongly
recommended that the U.S. implement a system “based on the Copyright Modernization
Act.”513
My discussion of Notice-and-Notice would not be complete without pointing out
the misuse of the regime by copyright authors/the companies that represent their
interests.514 Within a week of the provisions coming into force, rightsholders began
“exploiting a loophole,” sending payment demand letters.515 In some cases, the demand
letter state that recipients could be liable for up to $150,000 per infringement, or have
their internet services cut-off.516 However these are U.S. penalties and are not applicable
in Canada.517 Some U.S.-based anti-piracy companies have been sending thousands of
demand letters that do reference Canadian Law.518 These letters are also inaccurate, using
fear of a potential lawsuit to bully Canadians into paying settlements. 519 As a result,
copyright scholar Michael Geist has called on the Government to adopt regulations
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detailing what may be included in infringement notices, and prohibiting settlement
demands.520
Despite the misuse of the Notice-and-Notice regime, it is still an effective, noncriminal enforcement mechanism. Notice-and-Notice respects both authors and users
rights when it is appropriately used. It allows authors to assert their copyrights and have
their infringing content removed from the internet, while also respecting users rights. The
notices also have an important educational component, wherein they alert recipients of
their allegedly infringing content.521 This is important given that many people may be
unaware that their online actions may infringe copyright.522
B. Technological Approaches – Digital Rights Management
Digital technology has been repeatedly credited with facilitating large-scale
reproduction and dissemination of copyright protected works. 523 However, digital
technologies are also a potential source of protection for copyright owners. DRM
technology allows creators to digitally protect their content from potential infringers. In
520
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this Part I discuss two types of DRM technology: digital locks, and Blockchain
Technology.
i) Digital Locks
Digital locks (TPMs) exist in various forms.524 The oldest and most common type
of digital lock is anti-copy devices or technology. 525 These devices prevent, or make it
difficult for users to copy the work they protect.526 Commonly, anti-copy technology is
applied to DVDs, CDs, video games, etc. to prevent users for copying the work.527 Other
digital locks are used to prevent access to content.528 For example, DVDs can be
geographically restricted such that a DVD purchased in Europe will not play through a
Canadian DVD player.529 Similarly, the iTunes Store used DRM to limit the number of
devices that users can use access their downloaded content until 2009.530
The Copyright Act makes reference to two types of digital locks in s.41. The Act
defines TPMs as: “any effective technology, device or component that, in the ordinary
course of its operation, (a) controls access to a work… or, (b) restricts the doing…” of
any act that copyrights owners have the exclusive right to do. 531 Digital locks, then, as
they appear in the Copyright Act either restrict access to a work, or restrict particular uses
524
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of the work. The Copyright Act prohibits circumventing TMP’s that restrict access, and
offering services or manufacturing devices that are primarily for the purpose of
circumventing TPMs.532
The digital lock provisions of the Copyright Act are controversial, and received
significant criticism during the Copyright Modernization process. Critiques of the
provisions argued that they went too far in protecting owners’ rights.533 Geist, in
particular, argued that circumventing a TPM should only be a violation where it is linked
to actual copyright infringement.534 He rightfully argues that there should be a fair
dealing exception to the digital lock rules.535
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However, these criticisms do not completely undermine the potential for TMPs to
effectively protect owners’ rights in a manner consistent with balance theory. Instead,
they provide an opportunity for the Government to amend the Copyright Act to more
adequately balance users’ and authors’ rights, in a manner consistent with the underlying
purposes of Copyright Law. Geist’s concerns should be taken into account, and the
Copyright Act should be amended to require proof of actual infringement to constitute a
violation of the anti-circumvention provisions.
ii) Blockchain Technology
The Blockchain is another form of DRM technology that could be used to
digitally copyrights. Blockchain technology was initially developed as the backbone to
Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a decentralized, digital currency that is transferred using peer-to-peer
technology.536 It operates through a system based on cryptographic proof, eliminating the
need for a third-party to process transactions.537 Users download Bitcoin wallets to their
devices and use them to transfer Bitcoins to other users via the internet.538 Wallets
contain “private keys,” which are secret pieces of data used to sign transactions, proving
the currency comes from a particular wallet.539 All transactions are broadcast on the
Blockchain, which creates a time-stamped, chronological, public ledger. A network of
cryptographically-linked computers keep a running list of all changes made to the
Blockchain and link each new entry to former entries.540 This prevents double spending
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and allows users to verify the Bitcoins chain of ownership. 541 It also prevents hackers
from altering the Blockchain. Because all changes to the blocks data are linked together
through cryptography, even if a hacker could alter the data in one node, the other nodes in
the network would reject the changes.542
Blockchain technology, and the ledger it creates, has many valuable uses outside
of Bitcoin.543 Though there has been skepticism expressed about its ultimate usefulness
for applying or enforcing copyright, it nevertheless offers some unique copyright
possibilities.544 Blockchain technology could be used to create a ledger of content
ownership, whereby creators are able to register their ownership on a publically available,
time stamped ledger.545 This would allow authors to easily prove when they created the
work, protecting against third party claims of earlier authorship. 546 It would also allow
creators to prove authorship, since they would own the private key proving the work
541
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exists.547 This private key would also allow authors to sell users authorized access to their
work.548

Blockchain eliminates the need for authors to use costly distributors and

management companies, insuring that more profit goes directly to the rights-holder.549
Recognizing the potential for Blockchain technology in the music industry,
Spotify recently acquired Mediachain, which is a blockchain research agenda and open
source protocol.550 Spotify anticipates that Mediachain will help establish a “more fair,
transparent and rewarding industry for creators and owners.
3. Non-Criminal Enforcement is Consistent with Charter Values
This Part provides further support for non-criminal copyright enforcement. In
previous chapters I disassembled the theoretical justifications for criminalization. In this
Chapter I have argued that Copyright Theory supports non-criminal copyright
enforcement. Now I argue that non-criminal enforcement is also consistent with Charter
values. This part is not meant to be an exhaustive, comprehensive Charter analysis. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to set out and apply the infringement analyses in sections
7, 12, and 1 of the Charter. My objective here is to provide an additional angle, one
focused on Charter values, to my broader argument that copyright infringement is not
theoretically justified.
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I am not the first to apply a constitutional lens to criminalized infringement. Scott
& Collins argued that the presumptions in the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act
could violate the Charter.551 In particular, they argued that the presumption that someone
who registers a work pursuant to section 53 of the act owns the work and that copyright
subsist in the work, may violate s.11(d) of the Charter.552 This violation arises because
the accused bears the burden of proving that the complainant does not own the copyrights
to the work, or that copyright does not subsist in the work. 553 Scott & Collins conducted a
section 11(d) and a section 1 analysis, concluding that this “reverse onus” clause likely
violates the Charter in a manner that cannot be saved by section 1.554
While Scott & Collins’ arguments are valid, my focus is restricted to section 1,
and particularly minimal impairment. Minimal impairment is a constitutionally
recognized principle derived from s.1 of the Charter.555 It requires the State to “show the
absence of less drastic means of achieving the objective ‘in a real and substantial
manner.’”556 With respect to criminalized copyright enforcement, the government is
unable to meet this requirement.
Criminal penalties are more severe than civil remedies. This proposition should be
undisputed. Imprisonment is the most sever and restrictive penalty permitted under
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Canadian Law.557 This is recognized in various Charter provisions, including: the right to
liberty;558 the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned;

559

the right not to be

subjected to cruel and unusual punishment; 560 and, the guaranteed protections of these
rights in freedoms, “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”561
Criminal conviction, regardless of its mandated penalty, is more significant that
civil liability. This is evidenced by the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
in section 11(d) of the Charter, and the requirement for the Crown to prove all elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.562 Civilly, liability is established on a balance of
probabilities, which is a lower standard.563 Further, the social stigma associated with a
criminal conviction does not exist for civil liability. It follows that a person convicted of
criminal copyright infringement would suffer a harsher penalty than someone who
receives a copyright infringement notice pursuant to the Notice-and-Notice regime, or
someone who is subject to a civil copyright infringement lawsuit.
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The proponents of criminalized copyright enforcement also directly support the
proposition that criminal penalties are more severe than civil remedies. One of the main
arguments in favour of criminalized enforcement is the need for more severe penalties to
effectively deter potential copyright infringers.564 For example, Hardy states, “criminal
conviction is typically a harsher punishment than a civil penalty; as such, it has a greater
deterrence value.”565 He adds that copyright infringement “almost cries out for greater
deterrence and consequently for more reliance on criminal punishment.” 566 Although I
have argued elsewhere that increased criminalization is a weak deterrent, this weakness is
largely due to the fallibility of deterrence theory, and not an attack on the inherent
increased severity of criminal penalties as compared to civil remedies.
As I have outlined in the previous section, copyright infringement can be enforced
through non-criminal means. The Notice-and-Notice regime has proven to be an effective
enforcement mechanism, credited with the substantial decreases in copyright
infringement since it was proclaimed into force in 2015.567 DRM approaches like TPMs
and Blockchain Technology also have the potential to effectively enforce copyright.568
Creative, adaptable, technology-based approaches to enforcing copyright infringement,
such as TPMs and Blockchain Technology will allow copyright enforcement mechanism

564

See e.g. Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement,” supra note 8; DuBose, “Criminal Enforcement of
IP,” supra note 38; Task Force, Report, supra note 38.
565
Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement,” supra note 8 at 312.
566
Ibid.
567
See e.g. Part 2(A), above; See Geist, “Piracy Rates Plummet,” supra note 509; “Evidence on
Effectiveness,” supra note 507; “Notice the Difference,” supra note 495; See also Internet Security Task
Force “Six Strikes,” supra note 510.
568
See e.g. Part 2(B), above; Statsna, “Copyright Changes,” supra note 534; Geist, “Fix the Fair Dealing
Gap,” supra note 534; See e.g. Bell, “Copyrights and Blockchain,” supra note 540. See Montgomery,
“Only the Beginning,” supra note 543.
121

to evolve in tandem with technological advancements, rather than resort to
criminalization as a response to digital technologies.569 These three examples are less
drastic than criminal enforcement, with its reliance on imprisonment and significant
fines.570 Because criminal penalties are more severe than civil remedies, and copyright
infringement can be addressed through non-criminal means, it follows that non-criminal
enforcement is more consistent with minimal impairment than criminal enforcement.
4. Chapter Summary
In this Chapter I argued that Balance Theory primarily justifies Copyright Law.
Although the Copyright Act does not contain any preamble specifically outlining its
purpose, the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly stated that Copyright Law exists to
balance authors’ and users’ interests.571 It aims to “[promote] the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works and intellect and [to onbtain] a just reward
for the creator.”572 Leading Canadian copyright scholars David Vaver, Michael Geist, and
Daniel Gervais have also repeatedly articulated that Balance Theory justifies Copyright
Law.573
Understanding that Balance Theory serves to balance and protect both creators
and users rights, I argued that non-criminal enforcement is consistent with these
objectives, rather than criminal enforcement. Criminal enforcement overstates and
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overprotects authors’ rights by involving the State in what is meant to be a private matter.
This creates a power imbalance between users and creators and disrupts the copyright
balance.
Non-criminal enforcement is not only consistent with Balance Theory, but it is
also effective. I addressed three specific types of non-criminal enforcement mechanism:
Notice-and-Notice, Digital Locks, and Blockchain Technology. Although there are some
flaws in the current Notice-and-Notice regime whereby anti-piracy corporations are using
notices as demand letters, this issue can be address through regulation and informing the
public that they are not required to pay a settlement despite what the notice says. There
are also some issues with the current anti-circumvention provisions insofar as they
prohibit conduct that may not amount to infringement. Again, this issue can be addressed
by amending the provisions to state that only circumvention for the purpose of
infringement is prohibited. Finally, although Blockchain Technology has yet to be
applied to the copyright regime, its ability to protect copyrights is promising.
Non-criminal enforcement is also consistent with Charter values, particularly
minimal impairment as codified in s.1 of the Charter and interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Canada. Minimal impairment requires the State to adopt the least Charterinfringing method to achieve its objectives. It is undisputed that civil provisions are less
intrusive than criminal penalties. Non-criminal copyright enforcement is therefore
inherently more minimally impairing than criminal enforcement.
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In Chapter 6 I briefly review the arguments against criminal copyright
infringement and in support of non-criminal enforcement. I conclude by offering
suggestions on how the Government should move to decriminalize the copyright regime.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion
Criminalized copyright infringement is an important Canadian issue that involves
Constitutional principles and affects the integrity of both the criminal justice system and
the Government. Absent theoretical justification, criminalization is not a valid exercise of
State power pursuant to s.91(27) of the Constitution. During the next wave of copyright
reforms, the Government should take the necessary steps to decriminalize and avoid
further criminalizing copyright law. This approach may be inconsistent with the current
global trend, however it is consistent with Canadian values. Although criminalized
copyright infringement has existed in Canada for close to a century, no one has analyzed
its legitimacy from a systematic, theoretical perspective, until now. In this Thesis I have
argued against the typical theoretical justifications for criminalization and made a
positive case for non-criminal copyright enforcement. I have argued that Criminal Legal
Theory, Law and Economic Theory and Property Theory all fail to justify criminalized
copyright infringement, and that Copyright Theory and Charter values actually support
non-criminalized enforcement.
In light of these arguments, copyright infringement, whether for personal use or
financial gain, should not be criminalized in Canada. The question to answer now, is how
does Canada decriminalize the copyright regime, and what are the consequences of this
move? I seek to answer these questions in the following parts.
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1. Towards non-Criminal Copyright Enforcement in Canada
In order to decriminalize copyright law, the Government must amend the
Copyright Act to remove section 42.574 The Government reviews the Copyright Act every
five years. The next review is scheduled to begin in November 2017. This review would
be an ideal time to at least raise the possibility of decriminalization. Michael Geist argues
that the Government should make modest tweaks to the existing legislation rather than
completely overhaul the Copyright Act.575 He argues that because the act was
significantly changed in 2012, and some of these provisions only came into force in 2015,
the implications of the 2012 changes are still being sorted out. 576 In this situation, “a
radical overhaul would do more harm than good.”577 Amending the Copyright Act to
remove criminalized copyright infringement is consistent with Geist’s approach; it is a
tweak to the existing legislation to remove a problematic provision, not a radical overhaul
to the Act. This amendment would go a long way for the Government to show its
commitment to strike the appropriate balance between authors and creators rights, and
actually help achieve a balanced regime.
Despite Canadian sovereignty, and the Canadian Government’s ability to legislate
in Canada, there are nevertheless international aspects of copyright law that must be
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considered, including whether the government can decriminalize copyright infringement,
and what the implications of decriminalization are. I address these concerns in the
following part.
A. The Implications of Decriminalization at International Law.
International copyright law has a lot of depth, to which this Part does not do
justice.578 My venture into International Law in this Chapter is brief, as the international
dimensions of copyright law go far beyond the scope of this thesis. Because Canada is a
signatory state to various international treaties requiring criminalized enforcement, I
focus specifically on pacta sunt servanda, and repudiation. A detailed analysis of the
intricate arguments that could be made for Canada to justify repudiating its treaty
obligations, and the implications of such repudiation could form the subject of an entire
thesis. My objective here is to simply raise some of these issues for consideration, as my
suggestions on how to decriminalize the copyright regime would be incomplete without
at least canvassing these issues. I will speak about them generally.
i) International Treaties and Criminalized Copyright Enforcement
Canada is a signatory state to international treaties that require criminalized
copyright infringement. I discuss five here: The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS),579 the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)580 and WIPO
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Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT),581 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA)582 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).583
Canada is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
self-funded agency of the United Nations that “[helps] governments, businesses and
society realize the benefits of IP.”584 All WIPO members are required to ratify the treaties
that it administers. TRIPS, the WCT, and the WPPT are three of WIPO’s many
multilateral treaties. TRIPS requires member-States to “provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful … copyright piracy on a
commercial scale.”585 Remedies must include “imprisonment and/or monetary fines
sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes
of a corresponding gravity.”586 Both the WCT and the WPPT also require strong
copyright protection. Article 11 of the WCT, and article 18 of the WPPT, for example,
both require contracting parties to provide “adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures… which are not
authorized… or permitted by law.” Because the WCT strictly prohibits reservations,587
and the WPPT only permits reservations in specific situations,588 all member-States must
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comply will all treaty provisions. However, neither the WTC nor the WPPT specifically
require criminalized copyright enforcement.
Although both ACTA and the TPP have not been proclaimed into force, and are
likely dead as a result of the United State’s recent withdrawal from both agreements, they
are still worth mentioning, as Canada is a party to both. They require member-States to
“provide criminal procedures and penalties” for willful copyright “piracy” on a
commercial scale, similarly to TRIPS. 589 Both agreements also require specific penalty
requirements for copyright piracy, including: “sentences of imprisonment as well as
monetary fines sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future acts of infringement,
consistent with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.”590
Evidently these five treaties require Canada to provide for certain criminal
penalties for copyright infringement, though they do provide varying degrees of latitude
for what these penalties should look like and how they are enforced. The question now is
whether Canada can work around, or get out of these requirements in order to
decriminalize copyright infringement.
ii) Pacta Sunt Servanda and Repudiating International Agreements
Pacta sunt servanda is a jus cogens norm; it is a basic tenet of international
law.591 It requires that States act in good faith to perform their legal undertakings. 592 This

589

ACTA, supra note 10, art 23; TPP, supra note 583 art 18.77.
ACTA, supra note 10 art 25; TPP, supra note 583 art 18.77(6).
591
John H Currie, Public International Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at 153. Latin for
“agreements must be kept.” This is an important principle. Because states are sovereign, they have plenary
jurisdiction over their territory, and the people and things within their territory. No state can enforce its
laws on the territory of another. See e.g. Teresa Scassa & Robert J Currie, “New First Principles? Assessing
the Internets Challenges to Jurisdiction” (2011) 24:4 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1017 at,
129
590

principle has two important implications for decriminalizing copyright infringement: (1)
consent to be bound by international treaties cannot be unilaterally withdrawn,593 and (2)
treaties continue to be in force until they are validly terminated or suspended.594 This is
understandable; in order to meet their objectives to settle international legal issues,
treaties must continue to be in force. Treaties that can be unilaterally withdrawn or that
are easily suspended or terminated will not fulfill this objective.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies international treaty
principles.595 It contemplates suspension and termination in article 42.596 Treaties can
only be terminated or suspended in accordance with the treaty’s terms, or bases set out in
article 63.597 These bases include: (a) consent of treaty parties,598 (b) material breach, (c)
supervening impossibility of performance, (d) fundamental change of circumstances, and
(e) a conflict with a new jus cogens norm.599 Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any of these
bases are appropriate for Canada to repudiate TRIPS.600 Consent would be the most

1025. International law then, requires principles and mechanism to hold states accountable to their
agreements. Pacta sunt servanda is one such principle.
592
Currie, Public International Law, supra note 591 at 153.
593
Ibid
594
Ibid at 42, 77. A multilateral treaty is terminated by repudiation. A bilateral treaty is terminated by
denunciation.
595
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1996, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January
1980) online: <https://treaties.un.org/>.
596
Ibid, art 42.
597
Ibid.
598
See Currie, Public International Law, supra note 591 at 155. Parties can also agree in a new treaty to
amend, terminate, suspend, or release one or more parties from a former treaty.
599
Ibid at 62.
600
I refer only to TRIPS, supra note 10, in this section. Because the WCT, supra note 580 and the WPPT,
supra note 581 do not specifically require criminalized enforcement, Canada is able to abide by their terms
so long as it provides “adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies.” The non-criminal
enforcement mechanisms I discuss in Chapter 5 meet these requirements. I do not specifically address
ACTA, supra note 10, and the TPP, supra note 583 in this part because they are likely to never be
proclaimed into force. In the event that they are proclaimed into, my discussion in this part will likely
apply.
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viable option, though the U.S. would likely never consent to Canada withdrawing from
the criminalization obligations of TRIPS, given their continual push to globally enforce
copyright infringement.601 However, Canada may amend the Copyright Act to lower the
penalties associated with criminalized infringement to bring the provisions more in line
with Canadian values, as TRIPS does not set specific imprisonment terms or fine
amounts.602
2. Conclusion
While decriminalization is the ideal outcome, Canada may not be able to fully
decriminalize the copyright regime as a result of its obligations at international law. At
the very least, Canada should commit to not further criminalizing copyright infringement.
This would require two things: (1) not amending the Copyright Act to increase criminal
penalties, and (2) not signing onto any additional treaties that require criminalized
infringement, or entering a reservation to specific criminal provisions.603 Reservations are
a valid exercise of State sovereignty, however they must be permissible according to the
Treaty’s terms, and accepted by the other State parties to the Treaty.604
Canada will likely face some international backlash for taking a stand against
criminalized copyright infringement. This backlash will most likely come from our
American neighbours, who have been steadfast in their criminal enforcement of copyright
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See e.g. supra notes 25, with reference to Kim Dotcom.
TRIPS, supra note 10 art 61.
603
Reservations are defined in Vienna Convention, supra note 595 art 2(d). They allow States to consent to
a treaty with the exception of particular provision(s). They are permitted by art 17.
604
See e.g. Currie, Public International Law, supra note 591 at 147. For a treaty that does not permit
reservations, see e.g. WCT, supra note 580 art 22.
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both at home and abroad.605 It is important for the Government to stand up for Canadian
values and not be bullied into submission with respect to criminalized copyright
enforcement. The Copyright Modernization Act made significant contributions to
Canadian Copyright Law, which is now regarded as one of the most innovative and
unique approaches in the world.606
The Government should carry this momentum forward into the 2017 review
process and ensure they make the right changes to bring the Copyright Act even further in
line with Canadian culture and values. The Government should be committed to
Canadian values first, before looking to appease the international community. This
approach is consistent with the unique history of Canadian copyright law. We did not
fight for decades to break free from the Imperial Copyright Act only to succumb to
international pressure that is inconsistent with our core values.

605
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See e.g. Dotcom, supra note 25, USDOJ, “Vaulin Complaint,” supra note 296.
See Geist, “What’s Next,” supra note 492.
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